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African-American Farmers
and Fair Lending: Racializing
Rural Economic Space
by

Cassandra Jones Havard
"[T]he rules and the law may be
color-blind, [but] people are not."
-J. L. Chestnut, Plaintiffs' Attorney
Pigford v. Glickman. 2

I.

In the context of
small farm policy, two
core democratic
principles-federalism
and neutrality-are
ultimately flawed as
applied.

INTRODUCTION
The relationship of the
federal
government
to
the
economic development of the
minority-owned farm as a business
raises issues of political authority.3
The United States Department of
Agriculture'S
(USDA)
loan
qualification scheme allows locally
elected farmers-who, with few exceptions, are white-to
make substantive decisions regarding an applicant
farmer's creditworthiness. For many African-American
farmers, this structure has resulted in a sustained lack of
access to USDA's low-cost funds and, eventually, to land
10ss.4
The congressional decision that local farmers are
able to make the best determinations concerning borrower
eligibility for federal agricultural loan funds leads to
concerns as to whether Congress' federalism objective of
delegation of authority to local constituents can ever be
met. As an issue of political authority, the balance of
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power in the USDA loan scheme
between the federal government and
local citizens is unique and uneven.
The USDA process--calling for the
election of local representatives
among the population of farmers
within a particular county-gives
elected farmers
both critical
discretion regarding loan eligibility
and an opportunity for selfaggrandizement.
Racial minority
farmers' lack of access to credit-the
by-product of this long-standing
federal scheme-provides fertile
ground for challenging the devolution of authority to local
landowners. In the context of small farm policy, two core
democratic principles, federalism and neutrality, are
ultimately flawed as applied. The ideal of federalismthat state and local governments can share power with the
federal government-is lost when programs are not
monitored for compliance with stated goals and
objectives. The presumed neutrality of the USDA's
process for disbursing federal funds raises questions about
the congressional purpose given a result that is, at best,
described as the deleterious sacrifice of land owned by
minority small farmers. s Negative biases that should not
color a neutral governmental process have been given the
aura of federal approval.
This article focuses on how to measure loss when
racial discrimination dominates economic policies and
results in identifiable economic injustice. 6
More
importantly, it draws a nexus between credit availability
and intergenerational property transmission.7 This article
concludes that the loss of African-American owned
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farmland due to discriminatory credit decisions decreases
opportunities for inheritance of real property. The
proposed changes in federal law set forth in this article
can help to remedy the cumulative effects of USDA's
financing inequities.
Part I of this paper presents an overview of USDA's
role as a financial intermediary. It identifies the goals of
the federal agricultural lending program and explains the
authority and policy choices given to locally elected
farmers. It illustrates the direct competition between
friends and neighbors for low-cost loan funds and
summarizes the recent class action settlement of claims
between African-American farmers and USDA. Part II
describes USDA's approach as one with federalist and
economic underpinnings. It identifies the arguments
supporting devolution of power from the federal
government to local jurisdictions. It also examines the
competing theories of information costs, transaction costs,
and agency costs as they relate to USDA as a financial
intermediary. Finally, it critiques both the federalism and
economic justifications of USDA's decision to allow local
farmers to make credit decisions. Challenging the fairness
to minority constituent concerns of locally controlled
political processes, the article suggests that local
constituencies that do not mandate accountability for
minority interests may unfairly influence the supposedly
democratic majoritarian regime. Given the absence of
monitoring for compliance within the federal programs,
there is inadequate justification for the role of the county
committee in the lending process.
Part III discusses fair credit law and concludes that
the applicable statute, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA) is an inadequate remedy when credit
discrimination affects small businesses. That section
proposes an alternative way to measure the harm and to
correct the authority and operational imbalances. It
recommends a change in the make-up of the county
committee by allowing locally qualified citizens, who are
not farmers, to make the credit decisions. Next, it argues
for more stringent monitoring, record keeping and
reporting requirements in order to determine promptly
whether discriminatory lending patterns exist. Finally, the
article recommends an alternative way to measure actual
loss by allowing compensation for loss of prospective
inheritance.

II.

USDA AS LENDER

As a financial intermediary, USDA's credit-granting
procedures are atypical. First, in contrast to a traditional
lender, there is a lack of neutrality in the lending process.
The local farmers charged with determining eligible
borrowers are themselves eligible for the same USDA
loan funds. Second, unlike a traditional lender, the denial
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of a USDA loan request entitles the applicant to an
administrative review of that decision. The administrative
review process becomes a proxy for the inherent conflict
of interest in the loan eligibility scheme. For AfricanAmerican farmers, the lack of neutrality in the decisionmaking process and the suspension of the administrative
process used to challenge denials combines to create a
political system that limits their economic rights.

A.

IN THEORY: THE LOAN DETERMINATION AND

REvmw PROCESS
The 1935 Soil Conservation and Domestic
Allotment Act8 governs USDA's current financial
assistance and loan distribution scheme. The primary
objectives of the statute are to facilitate and provide
agricultural credit to the country's farmers. As discussed
below, that credit is distributed largely through a
decentralized process of local- and state-elected farmers
whose job is to promote USDA's policies and programs.
Through the Farm Service Agency (FSA), USDA is the
key intervener in the farm economy, providing price and
income support and loans at a below-market rate to the
country's farmers. 9
USDA lends both directly and indirectly.1O The
direct loan program awards insured loans to borrowers
who have been denied credit elsewhere. I I
Eligible
borrowers are those who have training or experience in
farming, operate a family farm, and are unable to obtain
credit elsewhere at reasonable rates and terms. 12 The
indirect lending program uses similar criteria but issues
guarantees to non-government lenders who make farm
ownership and operating loans. 13
Small farmers favor USDA loans for several reasons.
First, most small farmers tend to be unable to obtain credit
from commercial institutions. 14 Second, the interest rates
on USDA loans are generally lower than rates from
commercial lenders. Finally, USDA has a special interest
rate for "low-income, limited-resource" borrowers, and
subsidized interest rates are available for guaranteed
loans.
Limited resource borrowers are low-income
farmers who do not qualify even under normal USDA
loan programs and who need to maximize their incomes
from farming. IS
USDA uses the county committee system to
determine who will participate in its direct lending and
benefit programs. All farmers residing in a county elect
three to five local farmers to a committee that USDA
authorizes to make these determinations. 16 The members
of the county committee in tum elect a county executive
who has the responsibility to assist farmers in applying for
and reCeIVIng program funds and who makes
recommendations to the committee on who should receive
those funds. USDA pays both the county committee
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members and the county executive for their services,
although neither are federal government employees. 17
The loan process is seemingly straightforward: the
County Executive Director must assist the farmer in
completing his application; the County Executive Director
also does an initial review of the application. If the
county committee approves the application, the farmer
receives the subsidy or loan. If the application is denied,
the farmer may appeal to a state committee and then to a
federal review board. 18 Because USDA borrowers are
unable to get loans from other lenders, the proper
implementation of these programs and appeal of
determinations is crucial. 19 As a federal government
program, USDA has established procedures for review of
loan denials when applicants' requests are rejected. In
1980, however, USDA dismantled its Civil Rights
Division. Consequently, the complaints and appeals of
black farmers whose loans were denied were never
processed, investigated or forwarded to the appropriate
agency. Most African-American farmers who used the
USDA appeals process never received a response. USDA
admits that its staff discarded some discrimination
complaints without ever responding to or investigating
them,20 while others received a finding of discrimination,
but no relief. 21 The lack of response by USDA to claims
of racial discrimination in the loan eligibility process led
to a national class-action lawsuit and the on-going
settlement of claims by African-American farmers. We
turn to a discussion of this case now.

B.

IN PRACTICE: THE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
OF CLAIMS

A national class action suit involving minority
borrowers challenged USDA's dismantling of its civil
rights investigation division as discriminatory. USDA
responded to the lawsuit by announcing that there would
be no foreclosures where the farmer had a pending
discrimination claim.22
The Pigford v. Glickman class action suit arose after
the plaintiffs, four hundred and one African-American
farmers, alleged that USDA willfully discriminated
against them when they applied for farm operating,
ownership, disaster, and emergency 10ans.23 When a
farmer's loan application was denied on the basis of race
or some other discriminatory basis, the farmers were to
file an administrative claim with the Equal Opportunity
Office and also with the USDA Secretary or the Office of
Civil Rights Enforcement and Adjudication (OCREA)?4
Minority farmers allege that with the dissolution of
OCREA in 1983, the complaints filed failed to be
processed, investigated, filed, or forwarded. At best,
farmers received a cursory denial to the claim, but most
received no response whatsoever. Some farmers alleged
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that their claims were not investigated because they were
lost, destroyed, or thrown away. The Office of Inspector
General of USDA determined that minority farmers lost
land and farm income due to the agency's discriminatory
practices. In addition, the Office of the Inspector General
stated that the agency failed to act in good faith, that the
process for resolving complaints failed or was too
delayed, and that many favorable decisions were
reversed. 25
The Pigford v. Glickman class certification was
eventually granted for all African-American farmers who:
(1) farmed, or attempted to farm between January 1, 1981
and December 31, 1996; (2) applied for participation in a
federal farm credit or benefit program with USDA during
that time and who believed that they were discriminated
against on the basis of race in USDA's response to the
application; and (3) filed a discrimination complaint on or
before July 1, 1997?6
After almost two years of litigation, a consent decree
was issued?7 First, all class participants waived their right
to appeal the decision of the adjudicator as well as to seek
further review of these matters before any court or
tribunal?8 Second, the consent decree divided parties
eligible for compensation into two different classes based
on the amount of evidence the claimant possesses, Track
A and Track B, to prove that the discriminatory action
occurred. 25,105 claims were filed under the consent
decree as of March 14, 2001, with 21,285 (or 99.4%)
accepted under Track A, and 196 or .06% of the claims
accepted for processing under Track B. However, 3,636
claims were rejected for processing as not being class
members.29
Under Track A, claimants must meet the class
definition and provide substantial evidence of credit
discrimination to the adjudicator. The claim, which may
provide direct or indirect proof of discrimination, is
submitted in a written form describing the discriminatory
conduct. USDA has the right to respond to every claim,
with the adjudicator's decision being final. Of the 21,285
claims accepted for processing in Track A, 8,025 (39.6%)
rulings were decided against the claimant and 12,253
(60.4%) rulings were decided in favor of the claimant.30
Under Track B, claimants that have better evidence
of discriminatory action by USDA (i.e., documents and
witnesses) may elect to have a hearing before an arbitrator
to present evidence that discrimination occurred.31 USDA
also has an opportunity to present evidence in its favor.
Track B claimants must meet a higher standard of proofa preponderance of the evidence. They present their
individual circumstances seeking actual damages and
forgiveness of outstanding USDA loans affected by the
discriminatory- conduct.32 As of January 17, 2001, the
arbitrator had issued five rulings-three in favor and two
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against-out of the 198 claims accepted for processing.
In addition, seven cases had been dismissed including two
of which had been settled. 33 While the settlement of
claims will provide a measure of monetary compensation
for aggrieved farmers, the court's decree neither provides
for nor critically examines how a supposedly neutral
process became one of racial subordination and
domination.
III. THE COMPOSITE OF FARM LENDING
POLICY: THE DEVOLUTION OF POWER
FROM USDA TO LOCAL FARMERS
Federalism in the United States offers a unique
scheme of power sharing between the federal and state
governments. As part of this system of federalism, the
federal and state governments delegate their power to a
diverse range of institutions that design and implement
federal and state policies.
The devolution of design and implementation
authority, especially within the federal sphere, critically
affects the development and viability of economic markets
at local levels-at those levels where local officials have
significant implementation authority and/or influence,
there is legitimate concern over federal policy being
unduly slanted by the mores, traditions, and political
realities of the local communities. 34 Knowing that judicial
scrutiny of legislation intensifies where "prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities . . . tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ... relied
upon to protect minorities,,,35 it is legitimate to inquire as
to whether a local community's prejudices curtail fair
operation of federal policies so as to deprive the
community'S "insular minorities" of benefits that
otherwise would be theirs.
Using the plight of small minority-owned farms
under the 1934 Soil and Conservation Act as the basis for
our discussion, this section reviews the intersection of
political power and economic markets in the context of
the small, minority-owned farm. It concludes that, while
political decentralization has a capacity for providing an
adequate and fair process, when that process is flawed
sectors of the affected economic markets can be and often
are damaged.

the federal government's role to creating national
standards and disbursing funds. 38
Under a devolved power regime, the local or state
authority is free from the rigidity of a federal system that
may be unresponsive to the specific needs of its local
constituents?9 Such a regime has the decided advantage
of allowing quick response when change is either
proposed or imminent.
States invariably argue for
freedom to determine what solutions are best suited
without the overlay of federal discretion. When federal
program goals are broad, states can attain the program
goals within federal guidelines, but without explicit
federal direction.
Secondly, in theory, decentralization protects
democratic principles. The notion is that representational
governance allows for a truer determination of public
choice. Civic republicanism, by encouraging citizen
participation, seeks to join together the common interests
of citizens. The theory suggests that the guarantees of
liberty and the protection of property are best guarded by
local citizens, who have the most to lose if these
principles erode. Citizens who participate in non-federal
governance expect that they will have the ability to
express their choices free from federal interference. 40
Because the power of the government is made direct,
accessible and less impersonal, citizens gain access that
may be denied when they have to negotiate the
bureaucratic maze of federal government.
Finally, when state and local governments are given
discretion in allocating federal funds, they allow citizens
bound by geography the opportunity to participate in the
democratic process. 41 It is important to note that this
construct presupposes that those citizens who choose to
participate in the democratic process represent all factions
of their diverse communities and not simply their own
narrow interests. When this notion fails, the federal
government's policy is at risk of not meeting its objectives
and goals; consequently, as one scholarly argument posits,
federalism becomes a concept which espouses a
theoretical increase in citizen participation but does not
necessarily lead to an actual increase in such
..
•
42
partICIpatIOn.
1.

A.

POLITICAL POWER: COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
AND CIVIC REpUBLICANISM

One of the underlying premises of the 1934 Soil and
Conservation Act is that locally elected agents are more
appropriate decision-makers than federal government
bureaucrats when handling agricultural financing issues.
New Deal era reforms 36 delegated power to the states to
implement federal programs. 37 This restructuring allows
states to exercise discretion in federal allocations, limiting
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Flawed Representational Democracy and Critical
Race Theory
A solid justification for local control and decisionmaking requires a mechanism for accountability of
minority interests. 43 Although representational democracy
presumes participating citizens will use the democratic
process to fairly represent the best interests of fellow
citizens, opponents of localism argue that the minority can
become "voiceless" if elected citizens are swayed to
partial considerations. The concern that local prejudices
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may go unchecked by outside force underscores the need
for a political process that recognizes competitive forces
exist at the local level that can undermine guarantees of
liberty and protection of property. Weaknesses in
representational democracy are apparent when
constituents become increasingly disenfranchised and
silenced.44
In the case of small minority-owned farms,
representational democracy as evidenced in the raceneutral process of the County Committee system has
contributed significantly to the loss of African-American
owned farmland. In this instance, I posit that critical race
theory provides a basis for understanding how flawed
representational democracy presents an example of
political space and its consequences.4S In other words,
critical race theory provides a basis for examining the
construction of race as a neutral, accepted dominant
norm.46 While there is a tendency to view what is really a
failed attempt at power sharing between the federal and
local government as successful cooperative federalism, I
argue instead that the geographical space (the county)
defines the political space (who becomes representatives
or members of the county committee). The all-white
composition of those committees turned the race-neutral
process of determining loan eligibility into one of
domination and subordination.

2.

Defillillg Space
In current legal discourse, the term "space" denotes
geographical communities of people with similar
characteristics.47 Often these geographical areas have
become racialized 48 because of the groups of people that
live within them. In many contexts, race and place have
converged to represent a certain geographic pathosplaces where low-income and/or marginalized people live
and work.49 As one noted scholar has written, "[a]n
analysis of racialized space is complex for many reasons,
as it involves at least the consideration of politics and
public policy, racially signified and symbolized conflicts,
and aspects of hegemony, such as the construction of our
'common sense' understandings of everyday life."so
The notion of geographic space raises questions
about the allocation of power within communities and
how that power is used to determine the community's
cultural and social practices.S1 The basic inquiry focuses
on whether conditions within geographic spaces have
simply evolved due to private choices of individuals or
whether they have been perpetuated through public laws
and policy.s2 The evolution of almost exclusively white
ownership of farmland suggests it is important to look at
how the considerations of politics and public policy
converged to define farmland ownership as simply a
consequence of rational economic considerations. The
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circumstantial change in farmland ownership was not
incidental, but developed because of the social and
political forces that transformed the otherwise neutral
USDA structure into a system that adversely affected
African-American farmers.

3.

The COUllty Committee Structure as Political
SpaceS3
As a model of federalism, the county committee is
made up of community representatives making decisions
about the use of farmland in the communities in which
they farm. They lose their individual identifications and
become representatives or agents of USDA charged with
making neutral, ideally self-effacing decisions about
credit. County committee members are not asked to
consider, nor do they seem concerned about, the impact of
those decisions on minority farmers. They are instead
allowed to make credit decisions in a vacuum, not
assessing the impact on minority land ownership nor their
own inherent self-interestedness.s4 Yet, the historical
functioning of the county committee raises issues about
how that structure has politically defined the ownership of
property for African-American farmers.
One of the justifications for USDA's county
committee structure is that it represents a balanced sharing
of power. This line of reasoning argues for decentralized
government because it provides the average citizen with
an opportunity to participate in democratic functions.
Such a theory posits that the county committee structure
represents an appropriate mixture of local autonomy and
control. As a political institution, the county committee
structure emphasizes the values of citizen participation,
market responsiveness, and managerial efficiency.ss The
optimal political structure involving local citizens,
however, involves these citizens without creating group
boundaries.s6 While USDA may argue that the county
committee structure is a microcosm of democracy, an
appropriate balance of federal and local control must be
present to guard against the exercise of unfettered
discretion by non-federal governing units. Any exercise
of governmental power must be done in a way that is not
captive to a biased dynamic.
Given the theory of civic republicanism, it is
physical geography and the coincidence of residence that
determine the boundaries of the county committee. Since
its representatives are drawn from local counties and
elected from local property owners, it is assumed that they
are representative of the community at large. This
creation of a democratic unit based on pre-existing
geographical boundaries presumes similarities among
citizens that may not in fact exist. Thus, as one scholar
has argued, geography may haphazardly create a structure
that is impenetrable by legal doctrine.s7 In this instance,
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geography legitimizes the creation of a political unit that
may not in fact be representational.
One of the effects of the county committee structure
is that the county committee uses its decision-making
power to create white space. Using facially neutral
policies and procedures, the county committee structure
allows the competition for scarce resources-USDA's
yearly allocation of farm loans and subsidies-to
determine the committee's operation as a governance
mechanism.
By making biased decisions about
creditworthiness, county committees fail to render rational
decisions about credit.58 In this context, as in so many
others, the transparency of race becomes evident.
Moreover, as a political unit, the County Committee
is not accountable to the people it serves. While local
farmers may withhold their power to vote for certain
nominees, the real overseer of political responsibility in
this case is USDA. A system of governance where
decisions can be reviewed on the merit for bias or
unfairness, but in fact were not, again creates a political
unit that has an uncontrollable dynamic. The political unit
becomes, in reality, self-perpetuating, with little regard to
USDA policy. To the extent that the geographical
boundaries create and give license to a political structure
of citizen participation whose very nature impacts the
market economy, one can ill afford to conclude that this
political body's failure to account for the needs of all of
its citizens is sanctioned simply because of the manner in
which the political body was chosen. The long and sordid
history of racial subordination in this country, especially
in the Deep South, makes ludicrous any claim that the
mere provision for a democratic ideal, such as an election,
could ever rise above the narrow interests of the few who
stood to benefit from discrimination against others. The
system of agricultural financing through the county
committee may have been designed primarily as an
administrative function.
The justification for the
continuance of such a system falls far short, however,
given USDA's failure to monitor the operations; it must
be forced to hold accountable those elected locally to
defend the democratic ideals and principles in action.
B.

LOCAL ECONOMIC MARKETS

USDA plays a central and unique role in providing
financing to small farmers for several reasons. First, the
small farm, as with other small businesses, faces difficulty
in securing credit in the traditional financing market.59
Second, the atypical valuation of agricultural products
makes USDA an expert lender. 60 It has developed the
capacity to base economic predictions on crop values and
yields that more adequately balance the risk in the
business of farming. Third, USDA functions as a lender
to compensate for market shortages. As a lender of last
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resort, it closes the financing gap for borrowers who are
unable to obtain credit from traditional financial
institutions. 61 Given this country's general history of racial
discrimination, with specific focus on issues of credit
access, this third function makes USDA's procedures even
more astonishing.
Why then did USDA not provide credit to minorityowned small farms? How does USDA perform its role as
a financial intermediary, given market imperfections and
frictions? Three costs-transaction, information, and
agency-are the foundation of financial intermediation
and provide an explanation of the role that USDA plays in
lending to small farms, including those that are minorityowned. Identifying the informational disadvantages about
USDA-guaranteed loans highlights the limits on access of
minority-owned farmers have to capital.

Information costs
Information costs are incurred when lenders evaluate
a borrower's creditworthiness. The lender evaluates the
riskiness of the borrower's project before and after the
grant of credit. In markets that operate in perfect
efficiency, lenders have complete information, allowing
well-advised decisions about a borrower's ability to repay.
In less-than-perfect markets, lenders must incur costs to
determine whether the borrower will perform as expected
under the lending agreement.
To avoid incurring the information costs that
accompany lending, theorists posit that lenders ration
credit, making less credit available at lower rates of
interest. 62 The lower rate of interest, however, attracts
more borrowers to the lender. The lender then must
determine how it will determine the less risky projects that
are entitled to a lower interest rate. 63 Credit rationing is a
way to attain equilibrium in the market. A lender raises
and lowers the rate of interest according to the amount of
risk that the borrowers' project presents.64 Under this
theory, all small farms, including minority-owned farmers,
have unlimited access to credit at an interest rate that
appropriately reflects the riskiness of their project. Credit
rationing theory posits that because lenders have
asymmetrical information about a borrower's ability to
repay an obligation, the lender uses the borrower's profit
projections to measure two different effects: the risk
adverse effect and the moral hazard effect. These effects
measure two separate types of behavior in which the
average high-risk borrower is likely to engage: adverse
selection and moral hazard. 65
The adverse selection effect screens out potential
borrowers before the loan is made. 66 It identifies the riskadverse borrower by drawing a correlation between the
borrower who is willing to pay a higher rate of interest
with the riskiness of the project.67 This borrower presents
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contradictory infonnation on expected profits, e.g., she is
willing to borrow at a high interest rate because she
expects profits to· increase with risk. The low-risk
borrower, by contrast, will find higher interest rates
prohibitive, and will look for credit at a lower cost.
Lenders, who are not privy to sufficient infonnation
regarding the borrower's business operations, may thus
limit the amount of credit that they are willing to extend to
risk-adverse borrowers.68
The moral hazard effect refers to the borrower's
behavior after the loan is made.69 This effect measures the
incentive that the borrower has to engage in risk-free
behavior. This borrower is willing to pay a high interest
rate because of the potential for a high return. The
borrower's project, which is extremely risky, has a low
probability of success. Should the project succeed, its
return will be great. The lender is willing to lend to this
type of borrower at a higher rate of interest to protect
against default.
To the extent that there is asymmetrical infonnation
between lenders and small farmers, credit-rationing theory
suggests that small farms with projects calculated to yield
positive earnings may be unable to obtain financing at any
cost. Thus, an intennediary such as USDA becomes a
significant lender to the small farm market. USDA has
arguably created a structure that provides it with screening
and monitoring advantages that reduce the risks of adverse
selection and moral hazard. The county committee
structure allows USDA to become an "inside" lender, as
compared with a public market lender, who operates with
more limited infonnation in making arms-length
transactions.70 Arguably, this relationship benefits the
lender, who is able to ease the infonnation asymmetry
with some advantage accruing to the borrower who can
benefit from financing terms that more realistically meet
herneeds?l
The USDA decision-making structure places a
strong reliance on the county committee system.
Theoretically, the task of local farmers is to abate
infonnational deficiencies by providing infonnational
advantages when screening credit applicants and
monitoring borrowers.
What is required is more
circumspection into the adequacy of this structure given
its composition of local landowners, who are engaged also
in the business of farming.
The question becomes whether small, minorityowned farmers are getting all of the credit that is available
to them, given the benefits of this "inside" infonnational
advantage. Minority farmers would argue that within this
efficiently operating system, credit rationing exists not in
price increases but in reduced quantity or availability
rationing.72 While the county committee may be a crucial
link to the production and transfer of infonnation reducing
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infonnation asymmetry and credit rationing, the next issue
is whether the county committee plays a role in limiting
transaction costs, which also tend to limit the supply of
credit.

2.

Transaction costs

Transaction costs are the costs of acquiring and
verifying infonnation and arise primarily through
interactions between individuals.73 To some extent, the
difficulty that many small farmers have had in obtaining
credit from private sources is due to transaction costs,
which is why those farmers then tum to USDA for
financing.
Credit is available from various sources, some of
which are able to finance it more cheaply than others.
Financing costs include the charges that the intennediary
incurs for the credit review and documentation process.
The financi~ intennediary incurs financing costs when it
identifies and contacts borrowers and investors and when
it negotiates, verifies and enforces the contracts.74 These
functions can be prohibitively costly and interfere with
credit availability because they price the buyer out of the
market.75
The transaction costs that a lender incurs and passes
on to the borrower through the pricing of the loan are
most likely less than those that the borrower would incur
if the borrower were to find investors on her own. 76 There
are several reasons why these costs are incurred. First, the
typical borrower will have difficulty finding investors
willing to invest in an illiquid asset, such as a small
business?7 Second, the illiquidity of the investment also
contributes to its lack of diversification as an investment.78
Finally, investors cannot be protected from the credit risks
that accompany this unique investment.79 Thus, because
the borrowers' inability to identify investors willing to
take on the risks of default, small farm borrowers are
especially disadvantaged in the credit economy.
Similarly, an intennediary's transaction costs will be less
than those that the individual borrower may incur if she
were to seek her own investors. Although a lender may
have concerns about financing farm operations, banks, in
particular, are able to attract investors who are willing to
leave their funds on deposit with the bank for a variety of
funding needs.
For qualifying borrowers, USDA as a lender reduces
search costs. 80 Many farmers, including small farmers,
seek financing from USDA because it is a readily
identifiable source of funds. Although USDA, as a
specialized lender, is concerned with the liquidity of its
assets, its concerns are different because it is a
governmental entity.81 Unlike a bank, which must be
concerned about the liquidity of a loan because of the
investors who fund it, USDA has no similar concern.
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USDA has no investors. Its primary concern is in
maintaining congressional approval and confidence that
the fund is well administered. The U.S. Treasury protects
the solvency of USDA's guaranteed loan funds. 82
Functionally, in its role as a financial intermediary,
USDA's performance is enhanced through the use of the
county committees. Its procedural structure operates to
minimize transaction costS. 83 Financial intermediaries
routinely diversify risk, evaluate investments, and provide
liquidity to the investors. The county committee serves
this function through its decision-making structure. To
the extent that the county committee makes decisions
about the availability of credit, it arguably makes those
decisions based on predictors about loan performance.
An adequate assessment of transactions costs develops a
diversified portfolio among eligible borrowers. The
committee has discretion to make awards based on the
potential borrower's request or to determine that a lesser
amount is more manageable for the particular borrower.
Similarly, its cautious considerations on loan servicing for
troubled borrowers allows it to determine which
borrowers are less risky among the group of those that are
financially troubled and deserving of debt restructuring.
Thus, the county committee develops some expertise in
determining who is most eligible for benefits, given some
implied conditions. It also determines who actually
receives benefits based on its translation of the
information about the borrower and her ability to perform
as promised. 84 These functions overlap with the agency
costs (or the lender's costs) in managing the loan once the
borrower actually receives the funds.
3.

Age1lcy Costs

Agency costs represent the cost that lenders must
incur in determining whether the borrower performs as
expected under the lending agreement. One way of doing
this is to evaluate the business manager's acumen and
character. 85 The business of farming, as in many other
small businesses, requires a borrower who will advance
the business through hard work and great effort. 86 The
lender's manager must be able to assess the specific
abilities of the borrower as farmer.
Small business borrowers who do not have equity
will find it difficult to obtain credit from a lender. This is
due in part to the moral hazard effect. 87 The borrower who
has insufficient assets at risk has little incentive to refrain
from dishonest conduct or to exert maximum effort. 88 The
lender needs the ability to limit the borrower's moral
hazard. This requires the lender to find alternatives to
closely supervising the borrower, which is itself a cost that
may not have a corresponding benefit. 89 Debt financing
requires the lender to determine the net returns of the
business in order to assess the ability to repay the
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obligation. 9o A part of this evaluation involves assessing
the business manager's reliability. By relying on the
borrower or her manager to carry out the business plan,
the manager becomes the agent of the financing source.91
The desire to avoid agency costs may be implicit in
the county committee structure. By delegating loan
review function to local farmers, USDA is trying to
improve its predictions about borrower performance. Its
ability to monitor loan performance may provide some
insight into the prominent role that USDA has assumed in
financing small, minority-owned farms.
USDA loans are designed for borrowers who do not
qualify for loans in the traditional market. Eligible
borrowers are those who often are unable to obtain
financing because they do not have sufficient collateral for
the loan and equity investment in the business.92 The highrisk borrower's actions are difficult to control and it is
therefore unrealistic to think that she will behave as an
agent of the lender in monitoring the business' adherence
to its proposed plan. The borrower has little reason not to
adopt a "win big, lose big" strategy.93
It is possible that the county committee, in its
deliberations regarding minority farmers, is considering
the agency costs of the loan. Appropriately, under agency
theory, the committee may find that many farmers who
come to USDA as a lender of last resort have little to lose
or inadequate skill in business management, either of
which would make them poor debt risks. 94 While this is a
function of the committee, it is implicit at best, arising out
of the economic justifications of the county committee
structure.
If this is the case, the county committee is not
applying the proper eligibility requirements to the loan
application process. It is substituting its judgment of
eligibility for the federal standard. The county committee
may be using what it deems the standard should be and
thereby creating a more onerous standard. By qualifying
borrowers to receive USDA loans that have equity capital
to invest,95 collateral to put Up,96 or the ability to give
personal guarantees,97 the county committee as lender is
safeguarding USDA funds against default but also is
making loans to borrowers who would be eligible in the
traditional market.
The county committee structure is a social and
political force that makes race seem like a natural
phenomenon rather than a social construction.98 The
exclusion of African-American farmers who should have
qualified for USDA loans constructs segregated farming
communities. As a result, race and space converge to
impact the community in two ways. First, AfricanAmerican farmers become defined by the members of the
county committee as those who are not successful in their
occupation. Second, the loss of income from farming
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identifies African-American fanners as unworthy of loans,
which begins the vicious cycle that can lead eventually to
the loss of farmland for these fanners. This conduct by
the county committee breeds the continuation of the white
dominant norm. Because the exclusion of black fanners
feels neutral to the members of the county committee and
other local USDA officials, the perpetuation of whiteness
and disappearance of eligible African-American fanners
for USDA loans may be unapparent. The economic
consequences are positive for those white fanners who
themselves benefit from the domination of a raceconscious process that the white fanners can label as
neutral and rational. In fact, the white fanners have
racialized the neutral process to dominate economic
access to USDA funds.
C.

THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN POLITICS AND
ECONOMICS: LACK OF ACCESS TO CREDIT AS
99
REACIALIZED ECONOMIC SPACE

Because the business of lending is one of wealth
maximization, the rationales of economic efficiency,
capitalism, and the free market are more than adequate
justifications for credit and lending decisions. Denial of
credit based upon race or geographic location of
property,IOO presuming the applicant is otherwise
creditworthy, is clearly irrational because the lender
would forego a favorable transaction. IOI
The county committee, acting on behalf of the
lender, USDA, adheres to the principles of self-interest
and wealth maximization. 102 As lenders,
its
rationalizations for lending based on race or geographic
location of the person or property are arguably justifiable
based on poor underwriting conditions, increased
information costs, additional opportunity costs, and
perceptions of risks. Given the facially neutral regulations
that govern the eligibility for USDA credit, why are
county committees reluctant to provide credit to eligible
African-American fanners? A fundamental assumption is
that as lenders, the county committees are engaging in the
practice of redlining, a term that refers to making credit
decisions based on the borrower's geographic location or
the geographic location of the loan. 103
First, it is reasonable to conclude that the county
committees as lenders have decided to avoid entire
geographical areas, e.g., African-American owned
farmland. The county committee's presumption that the
borrowers are not creditworthy and that they are riskaverse leads to the conclusion that the property has a
declining value. Using USDA procedures, those who did
receive loans could be required to over-collateralize them.
Loans made to African-American fanners were considered
potentially unprofitable because of the threat of collateral
depreciation or failure to repay. A failed credit obligation
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was presumed. Thus, when the county committees did
make loans to African-American fanners, they were
considered profitable only if ,credit was extended on
unfavorable terms. 104
Second, county committees could argue that higher
monitoring and administrative costs justify failure to lend
to African-American fanners. By identifying loans that
might be unprofitable, USDA avoids the costs of
collecting on bad debt. lOS The information costs of
screening and monitoring make these loans more costly
and less profitable. The extraordinary type of evaluative
mechanism resulting in more processing serves as an
adequate justification for failure to lend. Yet, this is
precisely the type of informational advantage that a
localized lending structure should yield. 106
Third, county committee members rely on "risk
stereotypes.,,107 Their lending decisions are based on their
subjective perceptions regarding the loan's profitability
given their personal knowledge of the applicant and the
applicant's financial status. Race and farming skill
become indicators.
Undoubtedly, county committee
members would defend these perceptions as a needed
dimension
to
determining
the
borrower's
creditworthiness. lOS Presumably, this is one of the
informational advantages that close the lending gaps
instead of widening them. Subjective perceptions may
directly impact the borrower's ability to secure the amount
of credit she actually wants. 109 Inaccurate perceptions
result in lower loan amounts, which in turn contribute to
loan failure. 110
Decentralized lending offers some inherent structural
advantages.
It appears, however, that the county
committee system has failed to consider the need for fair
lending. One of the advantages that localized lending
should have alleviated is racial credit rationing and its
justifications. 111 An underlying presumption of localized
lending is that the decision-makers will assess the
dynamics of lending to their communities. While this
requires recognition of risks associated with lending, it
also should alleviate lending disparities by developing
more information about the communities and the
borrowers that better predict loan performance. By
devoting more resources to screening and monitoring,
information costs are increased, but more reliable
indicators ofloan performance are also developed. 112
Additionally, members of the county committees,
unlike bankers, are not acutely concerned with the impact
of the lending decision on the bank's solvency. A bank's
profit increases with each profitable loan made. Unlike a
bank, USDA's ability to lend is based only in small part
on the performance of its loan portfolio. 113 FSA's
congressional funding, while concerned with loan
profitability and delinquencies, does not use loan
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perfonnance or yields as a sole determinant for access to
federal monies. Borrowers are deterred from defaulting
on these obligations because they are barred from
receiving additional loan funds. 114 Thus the primary factor
that defines irrational redlining (competitive market
pressures) is absent in the federal agricultural lending
sphere since it operates in a unitary market, providing
loans to borrowers who are unable to receive credit
elsewhere. 115 The geo-Iending that results in credit denials
to minority neighborhoods is less evident in the rural areas
where white-owned or occupied farms may be adjacent to
black-owned or occupied farrnland. 116 Yet, a pattern in
lending disparities persists, perhaps due to irrational racial
redlining.
The failure to connect federalism and economic
theories as having a combined impact limits the measures
of needed refonn. While local agrarian interests have
received federal support as an institution, USDA's actions
elevated the role of the county committee to that of a
political institution that has the power to affect economic
policy and development. Political institutions that rest on
the attitudes and preferences of citizens as infonned,
unbiased decision-making but which are in fact operating
with bias and self-interest are abusing majoritarian power.
Any remedy addressing this type of abuse must recognize
and compensate for the true nature of the economic harms.

IV. THE PROPOSAL: AN ALTERNATIVE
MEASURE FOR THE LOSS OF
DISCRIMINATORY ACCESS TO CREDIT IN
THE SMALL BUSINESS CONTEXT
Legislation alone will not ameliorate the racial
disparities in fann lending. Perceptions must be changed.
Unifonn federal laws and effective enforcement can,
however, begin the process. In this section I recommend
two changes that have the potential to decrease farm
lending discrimination, improve the accountability of local
leaders involved in the decision-making structure, and
accurately meaure the complexities of the losses.
This section begins by explaining the deficiencies of
existing anti-discrimination statutes as remedies and then
recommends several modifications to the current USDA
credit-granting policy towards small farm lending. First, it
recommends changes in small business loan reporting
requirements, particularly in the recording and publication
of loan approval rates on small business loans to make
county committees more accountable.
The second
recommendation calls for a change in USDA's eligibility
criteria for service on county committees. This proposed
change aims to cure the inherent conflict of interest among
committee members that perpetuates bias and self-interest
in lending practices. The third recommendation proposes
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a theory of prospective loss of inheritance when small
business owners can prove a nexus between business
failure and lack of access to credit.
A.

THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT: AN
INADEQUATE REMEDY
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA,,)117
allows an individual to challenge discrimination in
economic or credit transactions based on intentional
conduct and subtle acts and policies that amount to
discrimination. 118 It applies to consumer as well as
business lending.119 ECOA would appear to provide the
appropriate remedial approach for black fanners, given
that small businesses were involved.
The ECOA,
however, has a narrower standing.
Under the act, a plaintiff may prove that a iender has
unfairly discriminated by showing either disparate
treatment or disparate impact. 120 Disparate treatment is
established through explicit and unambiguous statements
of hostility towards persons protected by ECOA. 121 Those
statements must prove discrimination without inference or
presumption. 122 The burden then shifts to the lender to
prove that it would not have made the loan in the absence
of impermissible criteria. 123 In a direct evidence case, a
lack of qualification may be asserted as a means of
evidence refuting causation. 124 Thus, the plaintiff must
show that given the financial institution's lending policies,
her proposed loan fell within those guidelines. l25 In a
plaintiff s prima facie case, she must demonstrate that she
was otherwise minimally qualified for a loan. The
creditor then has the burden to raise as an issue of fact a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the credit denial.
A disparate impact analysis makes it unnecessary for
the plaintiff to show evidence of a discriminatory
motive. 126 To prove a disparate impact case, a credit
applicant must show that the lender's practices or patterns
of behavior have a discriminatory effect and cannot be
supported by a business necessity. Even though the policy
or practice may appear facially neutral, the test measures
whether the statistical effect disproportionately excludes
or injures an applicant who is a member of a protected
class. 127 The burden then shifts to the creditor to prove
that the practice has a manifest relationship to the credit in
question. The creditor's explanation must be specific and
direct. 128 After such a showing, the burden then shifts
back to the plaintiff to show that the practice is a pretext
for discrimination. 129
The loan applicant has the
evidentiary burden of proving that she was qualified for
the loan, regardless of the theory of proof asserted. 130
The lack of minority applicants in many of the
counties demonstrates the disparate impact of USDA's
marketing and lending committees in the Southeastern
United States. Reported incidents included both overt acts
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of discrimination and experience with latent policies that
have the effect of either not lending to African-American
farmers or lending to them on different terms than their
white counterparts. This unwritten policy of racial
discrimination is without solid business justification and
has prevented black farmers from seeking or receiving
USDA loan funds without regard to the qualification of
the applicants. Statistics on the number of loan applicants
received from white farmers and the number received
from African-American farmers show the racial impact of
these policies. 13l Yet, even in a successful case, the
applicability of the remedy would be greatly limited.
B.

CHANGES IN USDA's REGULATORY STRUCTURE

Unijonn Applicability of Fair Lending
Requirements
Regulatory uniformity in lending practices can
address USDA's systemic failure to eliminate
discrimination and its lack of accountability in the county
committee structure. Aggressive enforcement of the
existing discrimination laws must be augmented by
initiation of new enforcement mechanisms.
More
specifically, implementing criteria similar to the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act's (HMDA)132 data-collection
requirements would allow small lending advocates to
uncover and investigate lending bias. 133 Only consistent
and uniform records for review can allow fair decisions
about who is receiving USDA loan funds. l34
HMDA's primary purpose is to uncover redlining by
lenders.
It requires lenders to provide sufficient
information for public inspection.135 Lenders must report
the number and total dollar amount of mortgage loans
originated or purchased by the institution during each
fiscal year, along with the overall approval and rejection
rates for each lender. 136 The statute does not require the
lender to disclose the reasons for rejection. Therefore, it
is difficult to uncover intentional discrimination without a
review of the complete loan file of a rejected individual. 137
HMDA is effective because it allows fair lending
advocates to use the data to show the disparities in the
lending process. By exposing a lender's unwillingness to
make objective decisions about lending based on income
and ability to repay instead of geographical sites of the
residential property, fair lending advocates have been able
to become more vocal about the limited credit access in
. . reSI'd'al
mmonty
enti areas. 138
Incorporating HMDA-like requirements into
USDA's regulatory structure could provide a multifaceted solution. First, it would require USDA as a lender
to have adequate record-keeping and reporting
requirements, alleviating some disparities in lending by
using the reporting requirements to provide a basis for
1.
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applicant comparisons. Implementing a HMDA-like
scheme would provide a basis for minority applicants to
demonstrate that they are being treated differently than
non-minority applicants on credit determinants like
farming experience, projected crop yields, and ability to
repay. USDA needs to develop the internal capability to
determine whether there is consistency in the loan
approval process based upon statistical evidence. It can
then become more accountable to its constituent farmers
despite its decentralized lending scheme.
Furthermore, requiring the reporting of the reason
for a denial of a USDA loan request can provide the basis
for more efficient investigation into credit access. By
requiring USDA to disclose the reasons for rejection,
more appropriate comparisons can be made between
minority and white applicants. Such a system would make
possible a review of loan approvals with loan denials.
Accordingly, USDA should be required, when requested
by a rejected applicant, to make comparisons between the
loans denied and those that were approved by similarly
situated applicants. 139
The data then becomes a
distinguishing basis for comparisons with other counties
lending on size of the farms and income levels. These
types of analysis will help unearth lending disparities.
Finally, unlike HMDA, the USDA legislative
scheme should provide a private right of action to farmers
experiencing discrimination in lending practices. This
would allow the data to be used in a meaningful way by
· tl·
those wh0 are dtrec
y lffipacted.140
HMDA relies upon regulatory examinations and
supervision for compliance. The possibility of individual
enforcement actions focuses the lender on the seriousness
and immediacy of potential violations. The proposed
schematic creates a relationship between the lender and
the individual applicant. Thus, the threat of financial
exposure, should a lending violation be found, creates
.
1en d'mg detenmnations.
"
141
incentives for more cautious
Moreover, a private right of action provides a fuller
remedy because it creates direct accountability by the
lender to the applicant.

2.

Monitoring the County Committee
ECOA prohibits creditors from engaging in
discrimination in any part of the lending process. 142
Although the statute does not specifically address unfair
marketing practices, discouraging minorities from
applying for credit is barred under the statute. This can be
read to include a prohibition not only on the way that
USDA identifies and assists borrowers in filling out loan
applications, but potentially to reach the composition and
authority of the county committees.
Local farm agents' differential treatment of minority
applicants constitutes a discriminatory credit practice.
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Under ECOA, USDA and its county committees are
creditors and may be subject to violations of the statute
for pre-application marketing and discrimination. 143
Under FSA guidelines, USDA employees at the local level
are responsible for assisting farmers with the FSA loan
application. The failure to assist minority farmers, many
of whom tell tales of being denied an opportunity to even
receive an application, reflects the USDA officials'
influence over the applicant pool: it is difficult to assess
the denial rate of minority farmers if they are not even
given an opportunity to apply. This type of treatment by
USDA representatives has served as an effective deterrent
to minority farmers from low-interest, federally
guaranteed loan funds.
The common discriminatory practices of the county
committees may be effectively remedied under ECOA and
through changes in USDA's regulatory structure. USDA
needs a more rigorous means to identify appropriate
borrowers and make the county committee system
accountable for irregularities in its distribution of
agricultural benefits and 10ans. l44 Mandatory changes can
be as basic as requiring USDA to send notices in advance
of yearly funding allocations to all farmers. It could also
monitor the guidance and assistance that local USDA
agents provide to individual farmers to ensure that it is
provided in a non-biased way. A more significant change
would be to establish an agricultural ombudsman that
systematically and randomly reviews credit determinations
for disadvantaged farmers. This type of self-enforcement
can bring much-needed credibility to a prejudiced process.
USDA should address conflict of interest situations
as well. It is problematic for those making the credit
decisions to also be the ones who are in direct competition
with potential borrowers for loan funds. 145 It should be a
violation of credit discrimination laws for a member of the
county committee, or his or her family, to purchase
property that is subject to sale based on a denial of credit
that has occurred within two years. 146 Instead of a county
committee made up of local farmers, USDA should
institute a committee system composed of disinterested
persons who are qualified for make agricultural lending
decisions. In order to draw upon a qualified pool of
persons able to serve, USDA should offer a training and
certification process that provides the opportunity for
competent local citizens to assume these decision-making
roles. 147
Recognizing the unique nature of agricultural
lending, there should be an expedited review at the
national level of minority farmers' denied loan requests.
By creating an immediate right to appeal, minority
applicants who may have been unfairly discriminated
against in the past will feel that the process is more
sensitive to their concerns. Furthermore, unnecessary
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delays in planting and harvesting crops could potentially
be avoided. The review can be based on previously
collected information from prior years' determinations. If
the information is readily accessible, the review process
need not be unnecessarily prolonged.
Finally, an
opportunity for a review at the federal level gives farmers
a better chance of assessing whether there is a pattern of
lending disparity among the local decision-makers.

C.

MEASURING THE INTANGIBLE BUSINESS LOSSES:
RECOVERY FOR PROSPECTIVE Loss OF
INHERITANCE

One of the complexities of the loss of a business is
that it is an economic IOSS.148 In tort law, economic harm
unaccompanied by physical injury is not usually
recoverable. 149 When there is pure economic loss due to
negligence, however, the law recognizes a remedy. 150
Such are the rationales of statutes recogmzmg
discrimination as compensable wrongdoing. 151 Actual
losses in an ECOA case may be minimal. 152
Compensating the business that suffers credit
discrimination allows recovery for the consequential
losses of income or profits. Compensation for credit
discrimination when the federal government is a defendant
is limited to actual damages. 153 The question becomes
whether that compensation alleviates the economic
injustice.
For the small farm that has been put out of business
by the federal government's complicity in a discriminatory
lending scheme, there needs to be recognition that the
discrimination wrongfully interfered with a business'
development. In the case of the failure or insolvency of
the business due to the discriminatory credit decisions,
actual damages should include compensation for the loss
of prospective inheritance. Such a contextual examination
could result in a fuller remedial measure by recognizing
the future stream of income that has been lost because of
the discriminatory conduct.

Loss of Prospective Inheritance
ECOA creates a duty for creditors to make lending
decisions in a non-discriminatory manner. In this regard,
tort law defines its duties and remedies. 154 The statute
allows compensation for actual damages and for punitive
damages up to $10,000. I55 Although the statute is meant
to halt discrimination for discriminatory lending to
individuals and small businesses, its remedial scheme is
flawed in that it fails to require a specific focus on the
decline in the business' net worth as it affects
beneficiaries and their loss of prospective inheritance. 156

1.

a.

An analogy to the wrongful death recovery for loss
ofprospective inheritance
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Special damages are those that are peculiar to each
individual case. 157 A damage award is held to be
"special" if it arises naturally, yet not necessarily, from a
wrongful act. 15S Damages for loss of inheritance are an
example of the expanded scope of pecuniary damages
currently available in wrongful death actions.159 Loss of
inheritance damages are generally defined in terms of the
pecuniary advantage the decedent would have bestowed
upon the beneficiary.16o
Loss of inheritance as a damage remedy captures the
rationale in tort policy that the injured plaintiff should be
fully compensated for her injury.161 Had the decedent
lived a full and normal life, she would have accumulated
property that would have passed to beneficiaries. 162 Loss
of inheritance damages generally consist of the present
value of property and earnings which the deceased
reasonably would have been expected to add to the estate
and, at natural death, would have left to her statutory
beneficiaries. 163 Despite their speculative nature, the role
of the jury in determining the propriety of a loss of
inheritance award provides a proper balance. l64
To prove loss of inheritance damages, the plaintiff
must show that the decedent, but for her wrongful death,
would have accumulated an estate and that the plaintiff
would have been alive at the conclusion of the decedent's
natural life to receive this inheritance. 165 Furthermore, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that she would be one of the
natural recipients of the decedent's estate. 166 Loss of
inheritance presumes an increase in the pecuniary value of
an estate, which the beneficiary must prove. 167

b.

Compellsatillg discrimillatory lack of access to
credit that results ill busilless failure
Property ownership, including ownership of a small
business, represents authority and empowerment and thus
entitlement. 16S Access to capital is crucial to the
continuous ownership of any small business. Capital is
needed to both stabilize and expand the business
production. The issues surrounding entitlement and lack
of access to credit combine to define future interests in
failed business property.169
The loss of a business due to discriminatory lending
practices is similar to the death of a party by tort. In place
of bodily injury is economic injury. A past harm has
occurred that warrants compensation because the
tortfeasor owed a duty to the decedent. In this case,
USDA is the tortfeasor because it had a duty to provide
financing as a lender of last resort to farmers who
qualified for USDA loans. Its actions-ceding authority
to the county committees who made discriminatory
decisions regarding minority farmers-proximately
caused the injury suffered by those farmersPo Many
minority farmers are limited resource farmers by
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definition who would qualify for USDA loans because
they are unattractive to lenders on the open market. 171
African-American farmers who lost their farms
because they could not secure adequate financing owned
an asset that was both business property and inheritable
property. To the extent that the economic remedy for
business loss seeks fairly and adequately to compensate
the injured parties, there should be a recovery for the full
economic loss and the loss to the injured parties, e.g., the
survivors. 172
Moreover, farmland represents a business asset that
is often bequeathed, making its loss more than just
economic. Thus, a theory of loss recovery must value as a
pecuniary interest the relationship between the small farm
as a business entity, the owners of that entity, and the
testamentary value of the property. The relationship
should recognize the unique nature of land as property,
the income-producing character of which is a business.
Analogizing further, the decedent is the small farm.
The landowner is the beneficiary whose rights have been
lost and should be compensated. What the landowner as
beneficiary has lost is both the income of the farm and
survivor rights that allow a choice about how the future
interests of the small farm should be distributed.
This is similar to what occurs when owners dissolve
a business. While the owner of a business has the right to
receive its present income while in operation, that same
owner has the right to receive future income that the
business creates once it is dissolved.173 Those rights are
not extinguished because the business has ceased to
operate; rather, they survive until there is no income
produced by the business. While the length of this windup phase may be indefinite, what is significant is that the
attachment of the right to the owner cannot be severed as
long as there is an income-producing nature to the
property.174 Thus, the dissolved business owners' right to
recoupment of the business' value, including income and
profits, is a vested right independent of the actual legal
existence of the business.
Defining property loss more broadly in this context
gives value to all of the economic benefits that property
ownership brings. By viewing discriminatory restrictions
to credit as a pecuniary loss, the law is recognizing that
racial disparity, in this context, affects federal agricultural
finance. This theory compensates the value of the
tangible and intangible assets of property ownership. In
assessing the market value of the subsequent loss, it
compensates for the fundamental harm suffered by black
landowners because of USDA's discriminatory practices:
loss of testamentary rights. 175 In conduct that i~tentionally
harmed without justification, the lender pre-empted fair
considerations and financially injured businesses. Thus,
as a special damage, the loss of prospective inheritance
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equalizes the real loss of land and the future interests that
the land as a business income-producing entity represents.
Discriminatory loss of credit becomes a lost business
opportunity, re-defined for this specific context.

2.

Policy Rationales Supporting Compensating
Prospective Inheritance Rights
Considering inheritance rights as property might
meet with resistance for several reasons. Among the
concerns raised are: (a) inheritance rights are intangible
property; (b) there is no entitlement nor expectation to an
inheritance nor are heirs identifiable at the time of the
loss; (c) the value of inheritance rights is too speculative
for courts to determine the amount the parties should
receive accurately; (d) future earnings are allowed in a
business loss; and (e) awards based on loss of inheritance
rights would be windfalls. None of these considerations
should present a significant barrier to recovery in this
instance.

a.

Inheritance rights are a tangible loss
Some may argue that inheritance rights are
intangible to the extent that they represent an initially
unquantifiable loss. However, whether those losses are in
fact immeasurable is a matter of perspective. 176 Property
rights that ensure that the injured party is fairly and
adequately compensated can be made tangible. The
failure to recognize intangible rights because they appear
to be based on conjecture does not mean that they do not
exist but that the law has not developed a workable matrix
for recovering them.
Inheritance rights represent compensation that is
adequate and fair for injuries and losses. In determining
the economic and legal bases for compensation, it is
important to focus on the rationale for tort recovery. To
the extent that the law intends to ensure that injured
parties are compensated adequately and fairly for their
injuries and losses, its optimal result is for the injured
party to receive compensation equivalent to the full
amount of her loss as well as the compensation that is
proportional to the loss.
b. Proof of expectation in inheritance is 1lot critical
The inability of the prospective heir to prove that she
would receive anything is another stated objection to
recovering for prospective inheritance loss. While there is
no entitlement to an inheritance in our society, most
property is inherited. 177 Recognizing a loss based on an
established legal norm is admittedly broadening the
definition of pecuniary loss, but the limitations on that
remedy are established by the burden of proof that the heir
assumes in establishing a right to a recovery under the
theory.
What beneficiaries must prove in a future wrongful
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death context is again instructive. A plaintiff must prove
that the decedent: (1) was a thrifty person; (2) would have
accumulated an estate in excess of what they left at death;
and (3) would have left this estate to the statutory
beneficiaries as heirs. 178 In the business loss context, a
beneficiary should be able to recover for loss of this
inheritance if it can be established that:
(1) the
beneficiary has received in the past support or income
maintenance; (2) the estate has the potential for an
accumulated or appreciated value; and (3) inheritance is a
pecuniary IOSS.179 Inheritance rights, although not based
on an expectancy theory, constitute compensation that is
adequate and fair for the injuries and losses because it
allows beneficiaries to recover the full amount of their
loss as well as compensation that is proportional to the
loss.

c.

The value of inherita1lce rights can be determined
with accuracy
Critics of inheritance rights base their objections on
the uncertainty of the amount the parties should receive as
well as the potential inability of the courts to determine
that amount accurately. Critical to recovery are the heirs'
proof of income and the prospect of its accumulation and
appreciation.
In this context, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the resulting losses were attributable to
the defendant's tortious interference. Forseeability in tort
law is assessed at the time that breach of duty occurs.
Again, the limitations imposed on the beneficiary by the
burden of proof serve as a control. Speculation is removed
by requiring that the beneficiary adequately prove the
accumulated value of the property, along with identifiable
and intended beneficiaries.

d.

Future earnings may deny appropriate recovery
Measuring business losses presents an array of
options, depending on the financial status of the business
at the time of the injury. These are losses that extend
beyond the current asset value, some argue, and should be
calculated based on lost future earnings. Lost future
earnings measure the income that the injured party will
not be able to receive because of the injury. Confining the
measure to lost earnings, however, is inadequate
compensation when there are limited assets. Those same
limited assets are financially dependent on the sustained
financial loss, since the farm needs the loan to survive.
Thus, an award based on future earnings alone might be
reduced because it fails to recognize how the income
generating potential might have affected the financial
need.
By measuring the present value of future increased
earnings, courts must project the increased earnings over
the business' existence expectancy and make an award
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based on that projected amount. 180 This theory determines
the actual economic value of the business and awards the
beneficiary a fair share. 181

e.

going to do about those hundreds of thousands
of acres of land that have been lost, hundreds
of thousands of black farmers who have been
put out of business because of policies that
were adverse to them?185

V.

There is an inherent presumption in the USDA's
funds distribution scheme that local jurisdictions are the
most appropriate venue for determining federal
agricultural assistance for small farmers.
This
presumption operates to make locally elected farmers
federal agricultural policymakers. It is questionable
whether this chosen operative is consistent with USDA's
objectives. Beyond question is that the scheme has
resulted in an indefensible reliance on the local county
political consensus to meet the department's goals.
Politically weak constituents, such as minority owners of
small farms, are not fairly represented in a system of local
governance that is captured by the participation of selfinterested parties.
An economic analysis clarifies how the existing local
structure is used. Yet economic principles, when viewed
in isolation, disregard the legal and relational aspects of
agency, authority, and hierarchy.
A contextual
examination of economic theory reveals that the small
minority-owned farm is discriminated against as an
economic unit. The county committee system allows
biased decision-making to flourish.
USDA's current structure raises significant
federalism concerns. Local control is not an adequate
means of implementing national policy and goals because
local farmers cannot be expected to execute national
policies and goals without maximizing their own selfinterest. The dire need for uniform and fair eligibility for,
decision-making about, and accessibility to USDA funds
can be remedied by more direct federal involvement in the
distribution of agricultural financing.
USDA must
implement more stringent monitoring of credit availability
and denials.
Critical to any review of USDA's credit structure is
recognition of the economic disadvantages for the small,
minority farmer.
The remedial goal should fairly
compensate those identifiable losses that are connected to
the harm. In this regard, intergenerationalloss recognizes
that the damage extends beyond the immediate harm in
discriminatory lending practice and is the needed counterbalance to a failed participatory governance scheme.
USDA is uniquely situated as a financial intermediary. It
must be held accountable.

Prospective loss of inheritance is not excessive
A basic principal of remedial law is that the injured
party should be restored to the status quo but should not
receive more than is necessary to do that. As a remedy,
opponents of inheritance rights argue that it represents a
windfall because they seem to go beyond what is actually
loss-the present income. However, that view does not
take into account that tort injury also projects future losses
that are impacted by the negligent behavior. To the extent
that the recovery for injury serves a deterrent function, the
measure for present as well as future losses serves to make
the injured party whole.
Requiring the tortfeasor to pay the full cost of the
harm done provides an economic incentive to prevent
future harm. Compensating the prospective beneficiaries
of the business that has failed should be an independent
loss and injury when it can be proven that discriminatory
access to credit resulted in the financial demise of the
business. 182 This claim is especially needed when there is
not an action for lost future earnings. 183 In the case of a
failed business due to discriminatory lack of access to
credit, there would be no basis for making a future
earnings calculation.
In determining the economic and legal bases for
compensation, it is important to focus on rationale for tort
recovery. To the extent that tort law intends to ensure that
injured parties are compensated adequately and fairly for
their injuries and losses, its optimal result is for the
injured party to receive compensation equivalent to the
full amount of the loss, as well as the compensation that is
proportional to the loss.
While this theory arguably expands the
compensation rights of business owners in credit
discrimination cases, failing to fully measure small
business loss when racial discrimination dominates
economic policies results in economic injustice. Economic
discrimination through loan disbursement may affect not
only present owners but prospective future owners as well.
Specifically, compensating the intergenerational loss of
land requires measuring the loss in terms of what the
property truly represents-a testamentary and an incomeproducing asset. This measure is a more accurate measure
of economic capacity at the time of actual loss. 184
CONCLUSION
[S]omewhere there should be reparations. It's
good to know that you're saying that we're not
going to have foreclosures, but what are you
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I dedicate this article to the memory, life, and work of my
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father, Robert Fulton Jones, who jokingly referred to himself as
a "book farmer" having eamed a B.S. in agri-economics from
Tuskegee University and a M.S. from North Carolina State
University. My father's professional career at the United States
Department of Agriculture spanned over 30 years. His first job
assignment with USDA's Cooperative Extension Service was as
a "Negro County Agent" in Wetumpka, Alabama in 1954. For
many black farmers and their families living in central and
southern Alabama, he was their "street lawyer," a compassionate
friend, and their only contact with a fair and just USDA.

sources (farm and nonfarm) below the median
nonmetropolitan income of the State; (2) operated by a
family dependent on farming for a significant though not
necessarily a majority of its income; and (3) on which
family members provide most of the labor and
management.
7 U.S.C.A. § 2666(c).
See also u.s. DEP'T OF AGRIC., A TIME TO ACT: A REpORT OF
COMMISSION OF THE USDA NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
SMALL FARMS, 27 (Miscellaneous Publication 1545, 1998)
available at http://www.reeusda.gov/agsys/smallfarmlncosf.htm
[hereinafter A TIME To ACT] (describing small farms as those
"with less than $250,000 gross receipts annually on which dayto-day labor and management are provided by the farmer and/or
the farm family that owns the production or owns, or leases, the
productive assets").
THE

Leroy Clark, Frederick C. Havard, Audrey McFarlane, and
Ralph Rohner were especially generous in conversations and in
reading drafts during the course of this project. This article was
presented as a work-in-progress at the Pennsylvania and
Delaware Valley Women Law Teacher's Annual CLE
Conference and at the University of Cincinnati Law School
Corporate Law Center, for which I thank Peter Letsou, Dorothy
Brown, and their faculty colleagues. Elizabeth Justice provided
fine research assistance.
Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 87 (D.D.C. 1999).
Since 1935, the Secretary of Agriculture has enjoyed wide
discretion to appoint county committees to implement
agricultural credit programs under the Soil Conservation and
Domestic Allotment Act (Parity Act) (Soil Erosion Act). 16
U.S.C.A. § 590h (2000).
4

Most minority-owned farms are classified under USDA
programs as limited resource farms. Congress created the
Limited Resource Program (LRP) in 1978, allowing the Farm
Service Agency (FSA) to make real estate and operating loans at
low, subsidized rates to small and family size farmers. See
generally, Agricultural Credit Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-334,
92 Stat. 420, 7 U.S.C. § 1934 (2000). A limited resource farmer
is defined as:
[A] producer or operator of a farm: (a) with an annual
gross income of $20,000 or less derived from all
sources, including income from a spouse or other
members of the household, for each of the two prior
years; or (b) With less than 25 acres aggregated for all
crops, where a majority of the producer's gross income
is derived from such farm or farms, but the producer's
gross income from farming operations does not exceed
$20,000.
7 C.F.R. § 457.8.
Small farm is defined as:

As used in this article, the word "farmers" refers to farmers
and ranchers as defined under USDA statutes and regulations. I
use interchangeably the terms African-American and black.
The growing decline of small farms represents a significant
detriment in agricultural production. First, small farms are
beneficial because of their diversity in production. Larger farms
have mono-cropping operations, while smaller farms are able to
offer crops in rotation and livestock production that results in
both biological diversity and ecological resilience. See A TIME
To ACT, supra note 4, at 35. Secondly, the discriminatory credit
denial negates USDA's mandate to assume a significant role as
lender of last resorts. USDA's credit granting function is critical
because of its expertise in farming. Farming is described as a
"narrow-margin and high-risk business." [d. at 34. For this
reason, many traditional financial intermediaries are not readily
available as lenders for farmers. [d.
African-American farmers account for about 3% of
American farmers, owning less than four million acres of land as
of 1991. There are reported annual losses of an average of fifty
thousand acres resulting in a projected net loss of $2.5 million.
This compares to ownership in 1920, when African- Americans
owned fifteen million acres of land and 17.4% of farm operators
were black. Lack of capital and access to financing and
additional technological changes are cited as primary reasons for
the decline. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 83-84
(D.D.C. 1999).
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act (Parity Act)
(Soil Erosion Act) Act, April 27, 1935, c. 85, 49 Stat. 163, as
amended, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 16 USCA § 590h.

[A]ny farm (1) producing family net income from all
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9

Money is specifically available for rural fanning operations.
Rural areas are defined in the statute as any place with a
population ofless than 50,000. 7 U.S.c. § 1932(d) (2000). See
generally David Westfall, Agricultural Allotments as Property,
79 HARV. L. REv. 1180 (1966) (questioning as sound policy the
continuous use of agricultural subsidies by farmers and arguing
that they create an entitlement); and Christopher R. Kelley,
Rethinking the Equities of Federal Farm Programs, 14 N. ILL.
L. REv. 659 (1994).

Insured borrowers may eventfully become eligible for
guaranteed loan funds through the USDA's indirect lending
program. Under this program, USDA guarantees loans made to
farmers by commercial lenders. The guarantee is for up to 90%
of the lender's exposure. 7 U.S.c. § 1929(h); 7 C.F.R. pt. 1980
(1998).

10 FSA is a federally created lending institution within USDA,
which makes and guarantees loans to farmers and businesses in
rural areas. It is often referred to as USDA throughout this
section.

15 7 U.S.c. § 1934(a). The limited resource rate is half the
interest rate on U.S. Treasury obligations with 5-year maturities,
but with a statutory minimum of 5%. Limited resource rates,
annual rates, and borrowers are reviewed annually for eligibility.
7 U.S.c. § 1927(a)(3)(B) (for low-income farm ownership loans
under § 1934) and § 1946(a)(2) (for operating loans). If they
are ineligible, borrower's loan rates are increased to the regular
interest rate. Dodson & Koenig, The Farm Service Agency's
Limited Resource Interest Rate Program in the 1990s, in ERS,
USDA, AGRICULTURAL INCOME AND FiNANCE SITUATION AND
OUTLOOK REpORT (AIS-64, Feb. 1997) at 38, 39 [hereinafter
ERS, AGRICULTURAL]. Because the FSA is a lender of last
resort, the limited resource loan rates have been used by large
numbers of borrowers. Between 1991 and 1995, 41% of
operating loans and 65% of farm ownership loans carried
limited resource rates, but more recently fewer dollars were
loaned at those rates. During some time periods, limited
resource borrowers have tended to carry greater debt loads and
have lower net worth than regular rate borrowers, but in recent
years there has been little significant difference between limited
resource and regular borrowers. Id. at 39-41. In recent years,
limited resource loan rates have been at the 5% statutory
minimum for both farm ownership and operating loans, and
since 1990 these loans have been targeted for beginning farmers.
!d. at 38. For comparison, on January 1, 1996, limited resource
rates were 5%; regular operating loans, 6.5%; regular farm
ownership loans, 7%. Id. at 46.

11
Direct and guaranteed farm ownership and operating loans
are granted to farmers who are temporarily unable to meet all
their expenses and unable to obtain private or commercial credit,
who lack sufficient financial resources, who have limited
resources, or who have suffered financial setbacks from natural
disasters. Direct loans are the more limited with a maximum
loan size of $200,000 and are made and serviced by FSA
officials who provide supervision and credit counseling. These
direct loans are typically farm ownership, operating, and
emergency loans but may also include youth project loans for
agricultural students interested in pursuing a career in fanning.
A portion of direct loan funds is set-aside for minority
applicants and beginning farmers. Guaranteed loans, however
are made by conventional agricultural lenders for up to 95% of
the principal and then guaranteed by FSA. The maximum loan
size is $700,000 and is used for farm ownership and operating.
As with the direct loan funds, a portion of the guaranteed loan
funds is targeted at minority applicants and beginning farmers.
See FSA Online, Farm Loan Programs (http://www.
fsa.usda.gov).

12 Borrowers may use the loans to acquire, enlarge, or improve
farms and recreational facilities, to supplement farm income, to
refinance existing indebtedness, or for loan closings. 7 U.S.C. §
1942. Amendments in 1996 eliminated the availability of both
operating and ownership loans for small nonfanning business
enterprises in rural areas and for other purposes. Pub. L. No.
104-127, §§ 602, 612(a), 110 Stat. 888, 1085, 1087, amending
§§ 1923, 1942. Loans for small businesses are available from
the SBA. See also 7 c.F.R. § 1941.

13
USDA must target 25 percent of its farm operating and
ownership loan awards or guarantees to beginning farmers and
ranchers. 7 U.S.c. § 1994(b)(2) (1992). Government-backed
debt interests are sold to generate funds to make insured loans to
farmers. Insured loans are made to eligible borrowers, who are
unable to obtain credit from commercial financial institutions
and agree to ongoing supervision of their fanning operations.
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See Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of
1990, S. Rep. No. 101-357 (1990).

14

16 Congress
re-authorized the committee's functions
recently as 1982, stating:

as

"Congress finds that agricultural stabilization and
conservation county and community committees have
served, and should continue to serve, a vital function in
implementing, at the local level, farm commodity, soil
conservation, and related programs; and that, by
assisting the United States Department of Agriculture to
conduct such programs effectively, such committees
provide substantial benefits to agriculture and the
Nation. Congress further finds that the agricultural
stabilization and conservation county and community
committee system has developed, over the years, into a
highly efficient mechanism for implementing such
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programs at the local level. Therefore, it is the sense of
Congress that the Secretary of Agriculture should ensure
that the structure and operations of the agricultural
stabilization and conservation county and community
committees, as heretofore developed to enable such
committees to meet the responsibilities assigned them
under section 8(b) of the Soil Conservation and
Domestic Allotment Act [subsection (b) of this section],
and related statutes and regulations, be preserved and
strengthened." Pub. L. No. 97-218, tit. IV, § 401, 96
Stat. 216 (1982) (emphasis added).
17 See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 86 (D.D.C. 1999).
One of the recommendations of the USDA's Civil Rights Action
Team (CRAT) Report was to make these federal government
positions, but to date that recommendation has not been adopted
by USDA.

broad and too amorphous with claims that were not typical or
representative of potential class members.
Williams v.
Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 344 (D.D.C. 1998).
24 This claim was to be filed with the Farmer's Home
Administration (FmHA) Equal Opportunity Office. In 1994,
FmHA was consolidated into FSA.

Another 1997 report by the Office of Inspector General of
USDA stated that USDA had a backlog of discrimination
complaints that had not been processed or investigated and that
the FSA program for discrimination complaints lacked
"integrity, direction, and accountability."
See Pigford v.
Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999), Plaintiffs Motion for
Class Certification Exhibit A (Evaluation Report for Secretary
on Civil Rights Issues) at 6.
25

26

FSA has a statutory obligation to provide its borrowers with
detailed notices and appeals related to any "adverse action" of
the agency. 7 C.F.R. § 1962.47 (1993). Congress conducted
hearings investigating the independence of the FSA appeals
branch. Although the National Appeals Staff is designed to be
an independent body, the Administrator of the FSA appoints the
Director of the National Appeals Staff. 7 U.S.c. § 1983b
(2000); 7 C.F.R. § 1900.51-.100 (1993). The congressional
concern led to a provision contained in the 1990 Farm Bill,
which was intended to reinforce that independence. Pub. L. No.
101- 624, § 1812, 104 Stat. 3821 (1990).

See Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 92 (citing Consent Decree at <J(2).

18

19 For example, when a farmer applies USDA funds or its
benefits program, the County Executive Director is to assist him
or her in completing the application; the County Executive
Director also performed an initial review of the application.

27
The court, in approving the settlement agreement,
considered the objections of numerous groups and individuals.
Those objections focused on the fairness of the settlement
negotiations; the amount of discovery completed; the definition
of the class; inquiries into collusion between class counsel and
counsel for the federal government, and adequacy of notice and
opportunity to be heard on the proposed settlement. Pigford,
185 F.R.D. at 82.

28

Id. at 92 (citing Consent Decree at <Jl 9(a)(iv)).

U.S. Dep't of Agric., Pigford v. Glickman: Consent Decree
in Class Action Suit by African-American Farmers, Latest
Statistics on Claims (last modified March 14,2001) available at
(http://www.usda.gov/dalstatus.htm).

29

20

See Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 86.

30

!d.

21

Id. at 90.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

"No acceleration of loan repayment or foreclosure will take
place on a claimant who has a claim pending." Pigford v.
Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 91 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing Consent
Decree at <Jl 7).
22

See generally Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of
Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and
Economic Development, 11 J.L. EeON. & ORq. 1, 19 (1995)
(explaining that a limited federal government's role in the
markets facilitates the political and economic rights of citizens).
34

The court denied a previous attempt at certification of a
class on the basis of lack of commonality. Williams v.
Glickman, Civil Action No. 95-1149, Memorandum Opinion of
February 14, 1997, at 7, WL 74547. The proposed class was all
African-American or Hispanic-American individuals who had
suffered from racial or national origin discrimination in the
application or servicing of FSA loans, which caused them to
sustain economic loss and/or mental anguish and/or distress
damage. Id. This class was denied certification as being overly
23
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United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152153 (1938).

35

36

Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
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Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REv. 663, 668 (2001)
(describing the New Deal era as the beginning of the "modem
administrative state" in which federal statutes provide for state
regulation to meet federal policy goals).

elections confines the successes to a geographically and socially
isolated constituency).

As in several areas of federal governance currently, there is
a tendency to vest state governments with federal political
powers. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Federalism and Economic
Development, 83 VA. L. REv. 1581, 1592 (1997) (describing
cooperative federalism as congressional programs that combine
federal and state authority). See also Sheryll D. Cashin,

CORNELL L. REv. 1309, 1322 (2000) (arguing that most whites
fail to perceive whiteness as a separate and distinct phenomenon
that results in racial power and subordination against the racial
minorities).

37

Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor:
Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L.
REv. 552, 552 (1999) (discussing how the ideals of federalism
that suggest giving states policy authority contributed to the
1996 welfare reform legislation).
38

See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311

(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

See, Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race:
Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REv.

39

1841, 1905 (1994) (explaining the intersection between private
entities which perform governmental purposes and racially
identified space) [hereinafter Ford, The Boundaries of Race].
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (1973)
(upholding town's zoning ordinance with a restrictive definition
of 'family').

40

Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Converse 1983" in Context, 47 V AND. L. REv. 1229 (1994).

41

Martha R. Mahoney, Symposium Whiteness and Remedy:
Under-Ruling Civil Rights in Walker v. City of Mesquite, 85

45

Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment:
Transformation
and Legitimation
in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331 (1988); and
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship:
Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKEL.J. 39 (1991).
46

47 Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: the Relation Between
Architectural Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning,
and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 699, (1993) (positing

that geographic communities of marginalized people have not
developed haphazardly simply because similar people have
come to congregate in the same area but have been created
through zoning regulations and government acquiescence in its
placement of public housing and development of urban
programs).
The process by which racial meaning is assigned to a
previously race-neutral social practice or group. John O.
Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation:
"Hewing a Stone of Hope From a Mountain of Despair" 143 U.
PA. L. REv. 1233, 1235 (1995) (describing racialization as a
"dialectical process of signification").
48

42 See Edwin L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 915

49

(1994) (arguing that decentralization allows for many of the
benefits of federalism).

295 (1999) (arguing that the Empowerment Zones Program
cannot properly be classified either as a tool to achieve social
justice or as a neutral, rational, and beneficial program for poor,
inner-city communities because of the limits it places on
economic development); Jerry Frug, The Geography of
Community, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1047 (1996) (discussing how
urban policy has resulted in the homogeneity of communities
thus denying residents of the opportunity to associate with
people whose opinions, values, and culture are radically
different from their own); and Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation,
Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1659
(1995).

The authorization of citizen participation may in fact render
license for abuse of minority interests.
James Madison
envisioned that local and popular biases could undermine a
government designed to serve all of its citizens. See JAMES
MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 10; JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST
NO.3.

43

44 In a somewhat similar context, one scholar has argued that
the majoritarian regime does not always represent the interests
of citizens and that representational democracy is weakened
when the interests of all citizens are not considered. Lani
Guiner, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and
the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1077
(1991) (arguing that black electoral success may not result in
more responsive government because result of winner-take-all
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Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space, And Place: The
Geography of Economic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv.

50

See Calmore, supra note 48, at 1237.

Culture here is used to mean group ethos. Scholars have
taken differing views about how culture should be determined in
ways that are representative of the entire group. See Linz

51
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Audain, Critical Cultural Law and Economics, the Culture of
Deindividualization, the Paradox of Blackness, 70 IND. L.J. 709,
781 (1995). Critical cultural law and economics is "the manner
in which law and economics informs and is informed by
culture." The study of this area has brought to light a culture of
deindividualization, "the attribution of psychological
characteristics on the basis of apparent and immutable physical
characteristics." Due to the fact that the very idea of race is
itself racist and thereby necessitates racial classifications and the
psychological attribution, Audain proposes a radical theory of
non-race.
Ford, The Boundaries of Race, supra note 39, at 1844. As
Ford explains, "political geography-the position and function
of jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional boundaries-helps to
promote a racially separate and unequal distribution of political
influence and economic resources."

61

See A TiME TO ACT, supra note 4, at 1.

62
See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in
Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 393
(1981).

63 Credit rationing consists of several models including
divergent views on rationing, price rationing, redlining, and
quantity/availability rationing. See Dwight Jaffee & Joseph
Stiglitz, Credit Rationing, in 2 HANDBOOK OF MONETARY
ECONOMICS 837, 847-49 (1990). The discussion that follows is
based on the last two elements.

52

64 See generally Larry T. Garvin, Credit, Information, and
Trust in the Law of Sales: The Credit Seller's Right of
Reclamation, 44 UCLA L. REv. 247, 284 (1996).

Credit rationing in the debt market presumes that the
borrower, not the bank, is the optimal source of information
regarding ability to repay obligations. See Helmut Bester,
Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect
Information, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 850 (1985) (suggesting that
banks can limit credit rationing with informational advantages
about borrowers that effectively screen them for riskiness of
repayment). But cf Joseph E. Seidlitz & Andrew Weiss,
Asymmetric Iriformation in Credit Markets and Its Implications
for Macro-Economics, 44 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 694, 697n.7
(1992).
65

As discussed in this section, the term "space" refers to the
mental imagery that one conjures when certain geographical
places become the primary residence of certain groups of
people. See Akoi, supra note 48, at 819-825.

53

54

See, infra Section IV. B.2.

55

Ford, The Boundaries of Race, supra note 39, at 1886.

See generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 1/Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 346 (1990).
See also Ford, The Boundaries of Race, supra note 39, at 1886.
56

As Ford explains, when legal doctrine fails to inquire either
whether boundaries should exist or how they came into being, it
permits a legal geography that is opaque because that theory
fails to address how the social and economic consequences have
created local jurisdictions. See Ford, The Boundaries of Race,
supra note 39, at 1841, 1858.

57

This system has created racially identified space-white
space. I use that term advisedly since the effects of the county
committee system was actually to create virtually all "white"
agricultural land ownership. See discussion irifra at Section
IILA.2. See also Keith Aoki, Direct Democracy, Racial Group
Agency, Local Government Law, and Residential Racial
Segregation: Some Reflections on Radical and Plural
Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 185, 197-198 (1997).

58

See Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in SmallBusiness Lending, 86 GEO. L.J. 1 (1997).

59

60 MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL
STRUCTURE 135-36 (1995).
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See Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 841
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 841 (1999) (arguing that community
market formation can help to solve the problem of adverse
selection).

66

See generally George AkerIof, The Market for "Lemons":
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanisms, 84 Q.J. ECON.
488 (1970).

67

Lenders operate under a model of eqUilibrium return, which
can be achieved by combining the desired level of risk with
lending at the risk-free rate. Thus, even loans with differing
levels of risk can function as perfect substitutes given the "riskadjusted'" rate of return. See generally William F. Sharpe,
Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under
Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 436-42 (1964) (discussing
the development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model); John
Lindner, Security Prices, Risk, and Maximal Gains from
Diversification, 20 J. FIN. 587, 597-601 (1965); and Jan
Mossing, Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market, 34
ECONOMETRIC 768, 769-783 (1966).

68

Moral hazard refers to the tendency of those who are
protected from loss through insurance or some other type of

69
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guarantee to have reduced incentives to prevent or minimize the
cost of loss. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral
Hazard: Further Comment, 58 AM. BeON. REv. 537 (1968).
See also Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75
TEx. L. REv. 237 (1996).

information costs).
There is disagreement about the significance of transaction
costs. As one author has said,

74

"[O]n one side, the economic theorists have not focused
on the practical significance or implications of the
theory of transaction costs. On the other side, the more
practically minded market-based law and economics
scholars have failed to discuss seriously the theoretical
implications of their conceptualization of transaction
costs in terms of the ad hoc categories. The theory and
practice of transaction cost analysis thus remain
disconnected. And the concept of transaction costs thus
remains something of a black hole."

See, e.g. Douglas W. Diamond, Monitoring and Reputation:
The Choice Between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt, 99
J. POL. BeON. 689 (1991); Raghuram G. Rajan, Insiders and
Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length
Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1367 (1992).

70

71 Numerous studies have examined the relationship between
inside lenders and borrowers, concluding that the relationship
results in the lenders having information that grants screening
and monitoring advantages not otherwise obtainable. See, e.g.,
Christopher James, Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank
Loans, 19 J. FIN. BeON. 217 (1987); Scott L. Summer & John J.
McConnell, Further Evidence on the Bank Lending Process and
the Capital-Market Response to Bank Loan Agreements, 25 J.
FIN. BeON. 99 (1989). Arguably, USDA policy replicates the
empirical studies that indicate that inside lenders may have
valuable information about firms. In this regard, county
committees may produce valuable information about borrowers
that USDA would not otherwise have.

Congress appropriates money for FSA farm loans as part of
the USDA budget each fiscal year. See generally Agriculture
Appropriations: Before the Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural
Development, and Related Agencies, 107th Congo (2000)
(statement of Keith Kelly, Administrator), available at 2000 WL
11068714. Each state receives an allocation of money from
FSA yearly. When funds in a loan program become depleted,
FSA will usually pool funds, taking all of the unused loan
money from the states and placing it in a national pool. See
generally Agriculture Credit Outlook: Before the House
Agriculture Subcommittee on General Farm Commodities,
Resource Conservation and Credit, 106th Congo (1999)
(statement of Dale Leighty), available at 1999 WL 8084766.
This allows FSA to move money from areas where it is not
being used to areas where it is needed, with states being able to
request funding on a loan-by-Ioan basis. FSA allocates money
based on the number of farmers in each state, the value of farm
assets, and net farm income. Id.
72

73 Transaction costs comprise three different expenses that a
lender incurs in making the loan transaction: 1) identification
costs or the cost involve in the business partners identifying and
contacting one another; 2) negotiation costs and 3) enforcement
costs. See Eugene Faa, Banking in the Theory of Finance, 6 J.
MONETARY BeON. 39 (1980). See also Lisa Bernstein, The
Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer? 74 ORE.
L. REv. at 239, (1995) (distinguishing between transaction and
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Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1661, 1674 (1989).

See generally Christopher James, Some Evidence on the
Uniqueness of Bank Loans, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 217 (1987);
Christopher James & Peggy Weir, Borrowing Relationships,
Intermediation, and the Cost of Issuing Public Securities, 28 J.
FIN. BeON. 149 (1990); Scott L. Summer & John J. McConnell,
Further Evidence on the Bank Lending Process and the CapitalMarket Response to Bank Loan Agreements, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 99
(1989).

75

See Amy Bushaw, Small Business Loan Pools: Testing the
Waters, 2 J. SMALL AND EMERGING Bus. L., 197, 216 (1998)
(explaining that prohibitive costs deter small businesses from
seeking their own investors independently of organized financial
structures such as banks).

76

77

Id.

78

See Mann, supra note 59, at 28.

79

Id.

80 As USDA recognizes, "As is true for nearly all USDA direct
loan programs, funding levels for direct [farm operating] loans
have historically been less than farmers' demand for them. Many
of these farmers are minority and beginning farmers who are
without the resources to obtain credit from a commercial lender,
even with a guarantee." Agriculture Appropriations: Before the
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural
Development, and Related Agencies, 106th Congo (1999)
(statement of August Schumacher, Jr., Under Secretary for Farm
and Foreign Agricultural Services United States Department of
Agriculture) available at 1999 WL 8085171.

81

However, note that as with private lenders, USDA requires
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collateral for its loans. See, 7 C.F.R. § 762.130 (loan approval
and issuing the guarantee).
In this regard, USDA's perfonnance is subject to yearly
monitoring by Congress. Its present loan perfonnance rate is
extremely good: it represents 38% of all non-tax debt owed to
the treasury and its average delinquency rate of all debts is about
6%, compared to a Government-wide average (excluding
USDA) of 23%. House Agriculture Department Financial
Management Committee, 107'h Congo (2000) (statement of Sally
Thompson, Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Department of
Agriculture) available at 2000 WL 23833112. As with other
government-sponsored enterprises, its debt is backed by the U.S.
Treasury. See generally Carrie Stradley Lavargna, GovernmentSponsored Enterprises Are "Too Big to Fail": Balancing Public
and Private Interests, 44 HASTINGS L. J. 991 (1993).

See generally Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding
Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 509 (1994).
93

82

A traditional bank may seek to minimize transactions costs
on the asset side of the bank through exploiting economies of
scale, amassing and evaluating a diversified portfolio of loans,
or on the liability side through issuing demand deposits and
developing expertise in providing related payments services. See
Eugene Faa, Banking in the Theory of Finance, 6 J. MONETARY
ECON. 39 (1980).
83

See infra notes 132-141 and discussion in Section IV.B.l.
arguing that USDA needs HMDA-like requirements because of
lack of record keeping and the inability to assess whether county
committee structure actually abates transaction costs.

84

FSA regulations require that the borrower must have some
limited, successful farming experience as a condition of loan
eligibility. See 7 C.F.R. § 762.102 (2000).

94

95

See Mann, supra note 59, at 37.

The use of collateral and the possibility of foreclosure is yet
another way to deter the moral hazard that accompanies
guaranteed lending. See Yuk-Shee Chan & Anjan V. Thakor,
Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and
Private Information, 42 J. FIN. 345, 347 (1987); see generally
John D. Leeth & Jonathan A. Scott, The Incidence of Secured
Debt: Evidence from the Small Business Community, 24 J. FIN.
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 379, 380-82 (1989) (applying
theories of secured lending to small businesses); see also Robert
E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM.
L. REv. 901 (1986).
96

See Douglas G. Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered, 80
VA. L. REv. 2249, 2263-66 (1994) (discussing the probability
that an owner-manager's personal guarantee will be secured by
the personal assets of the owner-manager).

97

98

See Mahoney, supra note 45, at 2005.

As used in this context, economic space refers to the
acquisition of farmland by white farmers through the denial of
USDA financing to black farmers.

99

By focussing on the manager's ability, the lender can
evaluate the borrower's ability to achieve the stated goals and
objectives in the loan proposal.
85

See generally Steven H. Hobbs, Toward a Theory of Law
and Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U. L. REv. 241 (l994); Donald
R. Korobkin, Vulnerability, Survival, and the Problem of Small
Business Bankruptcy, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 413 (1994).

86

87

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.

See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
88

89

!d.

90

Id.

91

92

See Bushaw, supra note 76.
7 C.F.R. § 762.120 (loan applicant eligibility).
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100 More generally, redlining refers to inappropriate behavior
on the part of lenders who use differential treatment in the
lending process to assess the creditworthiness of whites and
non-minorities.
See JACK M. GUTTENTAG & SUSAN M.
WACHTER, REDLINING AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1980). See also
David E. Runck, An Analysis of the Community Development
Banking and Financial Institutions Act and the Problem of
"Rational Redlining" Facing Low-Income Communities, 15
ANN. REv. BANKING L. 517 (1996); Stephen Trzcinski, The
Economics of Redlining: A Classical Liberal Analysis, 44
SYRACUSEL. REv. 1197 (1993).
101 See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A
COMPARATIVE ApPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 60 (1990).
Foregoing economically favorable transactions is not only
irrational but inefficient behavior on the part of the county
committees.

102 Many lenders who complain about the scope of regulatory
compliance within the banking industry argue that less
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government regulation would lead to greater economic growth.
See generally, Robert G. Boehmer, Mortgage Discrimination:

NEWS & WORLD REp., Nov. 9, 1992, at 41,43.

Paperwork and Prohibitions Prove Insufficient-Is It Time for
Simplification And Incentives? 21 HOFS1RAL. REv. 603 (1993).

108 One scholar calls this "unconscious racism."
Charles R.
Lawrence, III, The ID, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY
235, 237-38 (Kimberle Crenshaw et al., eds., 1995) (''We do not
recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has
influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on which
those beliefs affect our actions."). Taibi argues that because
credit decisions are based on subjective determinations of the
applicant's creditworthiness, perceived cultural differences often
factor into an examination of creditworthiness, making even the
most well-meaning white loan officers to perceive minority
borrowers as riskier than they really are. Anthony D. Taibi,

103 Redlining is defined in two ways: rational and irrational.
Rational redlining describes a lender's determination of the
creditworthiness of a loan based on the geographic location of
the borrower or the property. Irrational redlining describes a
lending philosophy that ignores the borrower's creditworthiness
since a presumably creditworthy borrower would yield loan
performance that would increase the bank's profit margin,
regardless of the location' of the borrower or the property in a
low-income community. A. Brooke Overby, The Community
Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1431, 145152 (1995).

104 See Runck, supra note 100, at 1203. Common reasons cited
include collateral decline, the borrower's creditworthiness, and
the higher incidence of collateral depreciation or the poor
quality of the surrounding neighborhood.

105 See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L.

Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment:
Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and
Substantive Racial Justice, 107 MARv. L. REv. 1465 (1994).
109

Swire, supra note 106, at 791.

In the context of small business lending, one researcher has
identified that the smaller extensions of capital to minorityowned firms results in a higher failure rate. See Timothy Bates,

110

REv. 291, 319-24 (1993).

Impact of Preferential Procurement Policies on MinorityOwned Businesses, 14 REv. BLACK POL. ECON. 51 (1985).

106 Lenders cite high agency costs as a reason to avoid lending
in low-income neighborhoods. Borrowers from low-income
neighborhoods tend to seek low dollar amount loans. The
administrative costs of lending small amounts of money make it
unfeasible for large profit center banks to pursue too many small
loans since these administrative costs must be paid for each
individual loan. Typically, the result is a strategy that declines to
make any loans within a geographical area because an
insignificant number of the loans made ultimately would be
profitable. See Peter Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending
Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEx. L.
REv. 787, 818 (1995).

111 The much-awaited reforms of the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA) recognized this principle. Among the benefits of
changing the CRA examination component from a process
oriented to a result-oriented one, is that lenders were required to
develop the information networks and provide more lending in
previously neglected neighborhoods. For examples of the type
of activity which the CRA has encouraged, see, CRA Lending
Can Bring a Profit, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Apr. 27, 1992, at
8; Roger R. Fross et. al., CRA Is No Threat to Banks that Do
Their Homework, AM. BANKER, Dec. 13, 1990, at 5; Francis X.
Grady, CRA Success Starts with a Plan, AM. BANKER, July 30,
1991, at 4; Donald Mullane, A CRA Success Story: To Bank of

Risk stereotyping is costless in that lenders are able to
identify which loan opportunities to pursue and which to forego.
See Phillips G. Gay, Jr., Credit Discrimination: Significant Risk
for the Unwary, BANK MGMT., July 1991, at 53, 54. For
example, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to use purely
objective factors in determining whether an applicant has the
character, attitude, and motivation to repay a mortgage loan.
Consequently, lenders are often forced to rely on their personal
values (which may encompass biases) when assessing an
applicant's willingness to repay a mortgage loan.
Risk
stereotyping is prevalent. A 1990 study found that 62% of
whites rated blacks as lazier than whites, and 78% thought them
more likely to prefer welfare to being self-supporting. See
Jeannye Thornton et al., Whites' Myths About Blacks, U.S.
107
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America, Investing in the Community Isn't a Requirement, It's a
Way of Doing Business, MAG. OF BANK MGMT., Sept. 1991, at
37; Georgia Steele, Seafirst Doing $1.5B CRA Program After
SecPac Merger, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, July 20, 1992, at 10.
But, a negative effect of the CRA is reflected in the stories of
some minority banks. See, e.g., Nanine Alexander, Tough CRA
Rules Hurting Minority Banks, U.S. BANKER, Sept. 1991, at 70
(describing the concern of many specialized lending institutions
that they will lose customers to mainstream lending institutions
entering their markets in response to a strengthened CRA).
112

Swire, supra note 106, at 833.

113

See discussion supra in text accompanying notes 81-82.
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114

See 7 C.F.R. § 762.102 (2000).

115 According to
Guttentag and Wachter, anti-redlining
legislation, community pressures, and adverse publicity are
significant factors that keep irrational redlining at bay.
GUTIENTAG & WATCHER, supra note 100, at 1 I.

116 Banking laws prohibitions against redlining do not apply to
USDA because it is not a federally regulated financial
institution.

Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691
(2000). The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, implemented by the
Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") through Regulation B, seeks to
prevent discrimination in credit transactions. ECOA prohibits
creditors from discriminating against any person seeking credit,
"on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or
marital status, or age." The statute defines "creditor" as "any
person who regularly extends, renews, or continues credit; any
person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or
continuation of credit . . . . " The fair lending laws apply to
commercial banks, financial intermediaries, such as mortgage
companies and credit unions, and to the federal government.
The statutes each focus on different, but complementary aspects
of providing credit to eligible borrowers.
117

See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GGD-96-145,
FAIR LENDING: FEDERAL OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT
IMPROVED BUT SOME CHALLENGES REMAIN (Aug. 1996) (an
assessment of the enforcement efforts by the federal agencies
charged with ensuring the fair and equitable access to credit for
minorities); Taibi supra note 109, at 1470 (arguing that the
ECOA is flawed in its suitability for ensuring fair credit access
to minorities); Craig E. Marcus, Beyond the Boundaries of the
Community Reinvestment Act and the Fair Lending Laws:
Developing a Market-Based Framework for Generating Lowand Moderate-Income Lending, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 710 (1996)
(discussing improved enforcement of the CRA and attempts by
the DOJ to expand the reach of the anti-discrimination laws);
Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending
Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and
the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237 (1996).
118

119 The statute applies to "extensions of credit to small
businesses, corporations, partnerships, and trusts." 15 U.S.C. §
1691 (2000).

See generally Susan Smith Blakely, Credit Opportunity for
Women: The ECOA and its Effects, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 655
(1981).
120

121 Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858,861-62
(5th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920,
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923 (11 th Cir. 1990); Barabano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d
139, 145 (2d Cir. 1990); de la Cruz v. NY City Human Res.
Dep't, 884 F. Supp. 112, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 82 F.3d 16
(2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, (199 7 ).
122

See Moore v. U.S. Dep't. of Agric., 55 F. 3d 991 (1995).

123 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276-77,
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (1989).

124 In a plaintiffs prima facie case, she must demonstrate that
she was otherwise qualified for a loan. The creditor then has the
burden to come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the credit denial. See Mercado-Garcia v. Ponce Fed.
Bank, 979 F.2d 890, 893 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Tex. Dep't. of
Comty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

125 See generally Sayers v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
522 F. Supp. 835 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Cragin v. First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 498 F. Supp. 379 (D. Nev. 1980); Anderson v.
United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1982).

126 Int'I Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
336n.15 (1977).

127 The FRB's Official Commentary to Regulation B expressly
states that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to show that a
defendant has acted with intent to discriminate in order to
prevail on a disparate impact claim: a facially neutral practice
may violate the ECOA and Regulation B "even though the
creditor has no intent to discriminate." Official Commentary, 12
C.F.R. § 202.6(a)-2.

128 This governing standard is often described as the McDonnell
Douglas framework. S.R. No. 94-589, at 4 (1976). Congress
codified the Griggs holding in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42
U.S.c. §§ 2000e to 2000e-2 (1994).

129 Circuit courts have used varying approaches to statistical
showing of discriminatory purpose, balancing test, burdenshifting, greater adverse impact, statistical showing of
discriminatory purpose and discriminatory intent or purpose. See
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409
(7th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nom., Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).

130 The present test employed in the circuit courts as a basis for
determining that the conduct was unlawful in the mortgage
lending area is the "functional equivalent test." This test of
intentional discrimination is essentially the narrow disparate
impact test set forth initially in McDonnell-Douglass v. Green.
Similarly, Justice O'Connor in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and
Trust, 481 U.S. 1012, (1987) held that unlawful disparate
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impact should be the "functional equivalent" of intentional
discrimination. Thus, in addition to pleading with particularity
the nature of the discriminatory conduct and identifying the
appropriate applicant pool, the plaintiff must prove that the
specified conduct resulted in the alleged discrimination. The
defendant then has the burden of proving a business necessity,
after which the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
there are less discriminatory alternatives under the ECOA.
131 Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 87 (D.D.C. 1999)
(citing Exhibit B, U.S. Dep't of Agric. Civil Rights Action Team
(Feb. 1997) at 38).
132 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94200, 89 Stat 1124, 1125 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
2801-2810 (1988)). As originally enacted, the HMDA applied
only to federally chartered or insured lenders, such as
commercial banks or savings and loan associations, and to
lenders who sold their originated mortgages to Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, or the Government National Mortgage Association
(Ginnie Mae). See Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, §
303. In 1989, the Act was amended so that mortgage companies
and other lenders would be subject to its data collection and
reporting requirements.
Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
103 Stat 183, 191 (codified at scattered U.S.C. sections). Small
lenders are exempt, however. 12 U.S.C. § 2808 (1988). There
is no HMDA requirement for USDA or for Small Business
Association, both of which are sources of financing for
agricultural loans.
133 Although the CRA's prohibitions on redlining arguably
apply, that type of geo-Iending is less evident in the rural areas
where white-oWlled or occupied farms may be adjacent to blackOWlled or occupied farmland. Therefore, a pattern in lending
disparities due to the race of the applicant cannot be easily
discerned. Redlining can be challenged under a disparate
impact standard if minority small farmers have been denied
credit in disproportionate numbers or by proving that the county
committees as creditors excluded certain communities because
of their race or ethnicity. Creditors must show that they have a
justifiable business reason for treating certain communities
differently.
134 Although the subject of much debate, ECOA does not
require statistics regarding small business loans to be reported.
12 C.F.R. pt 202 [Regulation B] (2001).

See generally Stephen M. Dane, Eliminating the Labyrinth:
A Proposal to Simplify Federal Mortgage Lending
Discrimination Laws, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 527 (1993); Robert
G. Boehmer, Mortgage Discrimination: Paperwork and
Prohibitions Prove Insufficient-Is it Time for Simplifications
135
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and Incentives? 21 HOFSTRAL. REv. 603 (1993); Steven Kalar,
Two Steps Back: British Lessons For American Fair Lending
Reform, 19 HASTINGS INTi.. & COMPo L. Rev. 139 (1995).
136

12 U.S.C. § 2803 (1988).

137 See Thomas V. First Fed. Sav. Bank, 653 F. Supp. 1330,
1341 (N.D. In. 1987) (holding that HMDA data, standing alone
and without additional evidence, did not prove a claim of
redlining); George Galster, Statistical Proof of Discrimination
in Home Mortgage Lending, 7 REv. BANKING & FIN. SERVS.
187, 196-97 (1991).

138 Richard D. Marsico, Shedding Some Light on Lending: The
Effect of Expanded Disclosure Laws on Home Mortgage
Marketing, Lending And Discrimination in The New York
Metropolitan Area, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 481 (1999) (arguing
that HMDA's requirements that banks disclose additional
information about their residential real estate-related loans,
including the number of applications t.i.ey received, the race,
income and gender of each applicant, the census tract in which
the property was located, and the disposition of each application
has resulted in more loans to low- and moderate-income
persons).
139 See Anne M. Regan, Note, The Community Reinvestment
Act Regulations: Another Attempt to Control Redlining, 28
CAlli. U. LAW REVIEW 635, 651, 658 (1979) (recommending
HMDA require lenders to support justifications for mortgage
loan denials by comparing the loans denied with loans granted
in the nearby proximity).

140 HMDA does not create a private cause of action for
individuals against those who have violated the statute's
provisions. In this regard, it does not prohibit discriminatory
conduct or end discriminatory practices. HMDA data assists the
financial institution regulatory agencies in uncovering patterns
of bias by lenders and supporting industries. Its sole objective is
to affect lender's marketing behavior through deterrence.

141 See generally James W. Bowen, Farm Credit: Is There a
Private Right of Action under the Agricultural Credit Act of
I987?, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 723 (1990); Eric J. Gold, Implication
of a Private Right of Action, 1 J. LEGAL ADvOC. & PRAC. 203
(1999); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1193 (1982).

142 15 U.S.C.§1691(a) (1994).
Under Regulation B, an
"applicant" is anyone who "requests or who has received
credit," and an "application" is an "oral or written request for an
extension of credit." Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1998). In
addition, the comments that accompany the note explain that a
credit practice that treats applicants differently on a prohibited
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basis violates the law because it violates the general rule against
discriminatory treatment. Finally, only an "aggrieved applicant"
can sue for damages or equitable and declaratory relief under the
ECOA. 15 U.S.C § 1691e(a)-(c).
143 Timothy C. Lambert, Fair Marketing: Challenging PreApplication Lending Practices, 87 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2202 (1999).

144

As the District Court found:
The county committees do not represent the racial
diversity of the communities they serve. In 1996, in the
Southeast Region, the region in the United States with
the most African American farmers, just barely over 1%
of the county commissioners were African American (28
out of a total of 2469). See CRAT Report at 19. In the
Southwest region, only 0.3% of the county
commissioners were African American. In two of the
remaining three regions, there was not a single African
American county commissioner. Nationwide, only 37
county commissioners were African American out of a
total of8147 commissioners-approximately 0.45%.

Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 87 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing
Exhibit B, U.S. Dep't of Agric. Civil Rights Action Team, Feb.
1997 at 2).
A
Civil
Rights
Action
Team
Report
made
recommendations that would potentially change the
composition of the county committee and possibly the lending
disparities suggested having at least one minority member on
each committee. Therefore, if through the elective process the
farmers do not elect a minority farmer, CRAT recommended
that USDA appoint one. /d. At 87 (citing Exhibit B, U.S.
Dep't of Agric. Civil Rights Action Team, Feb. 1997, at 2).
In the banking context, the term "affiliated party" casts a
wide net. The banking regulatory structure, which is a system of
federal rules, requires that affiliated or interested parties disclose
the presence of the conflict and not participate in the decisionmaking process. See 12 C.F.R. § 366.2 (2000).
145

146 The two-year limitation presents a "cooling off' period and
a safe harbor that allows any benefit inherent in the denial of the
loan to pass. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 650.1(2000). See also
Revised Model Business Corporation Act ("RMBCA") §§ 8.50 8.52 (defining potential conflict of interest as one that is
material and in which the circumstances have altered so that a
reasonable observer with knowledge of the relevant facts would
conclude that the conflicting interest adversely affects the
corporation's interests).

147

the "experts," their decisions are recommendations that are
made to the County Executive. In this regard, the USDA
representative's consultative role would remain critical to an
understanding of the specifics of agricultural lending. Many
disciplines use independent persons trained in the specific area
to make critical, neutral decisions. See Edward Burnett,
Arbitration and Constillltional Rights, 71 N.C.L. REv. 81
(1992).
148 Economic loss is defined as harm to one's financial interests
which may include lost profits, diminution in value,
consequential damages, etc. It does not include the financial
harm that is derivative of bodily injury or property damage, such
as lost earnings, medical expense, or cost of repair. See Frank.
Nussbaum, The Economic Loss Rule and Intentional Torts: a
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